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        Introduction
Although natural  disasters are indifferent to political borders, people and their institutions are not. 
Natural disasters can wreak havoc to any society. However, small islands are especially vulnerable, 
since one natural disaster, like a hurricane or a volcanic eruption, can affect, or even lay waste to an 
entire island. How can a small island cope with these kinds of disasters if one such catastrophe can 
seriously hamper or even destroy the entire ability of an island to engage in disaster recovery? Across 
the world there are many small island states, or entities. They have very differing constitutional forms. 
Some island states are independent, like Grenada or Barbados in the Caribbean, or Nauru in the Pacific. 
Other small island states are affiliated in many different ways with other (island) states. Some of these 
are  still  affiliated  with  their  former  colonizers,  like  the  Dutch,  French,  American  or  British 
dependencies  across  the  globe.  These  small  island  entities  and  their  metropoles  have  varying 
constitutional ties. Thus these islands tend to be governed differently. And difference in governance can 
lead to different approaches to disaster-management. 
The Caribbean is one of the most diverse areas in the world when it comes to constitutional 
make-up. For this paper, the focus will be on the islands of the Lesser Antilles, which is the string of 
islands that form the eastern boundary of the Caribbean sea and the islands of the southern Caribbean, 
north of South America. Some of these islands still have constitutional ties with their former 
colonizers, while others have become independent states. Needless to say, different entities cope 
differently with the advent, occurrence and aftermath of politically indiscriminate natural disasters. But 
how and to what extent do the constitutional ties influence the islands’ capability to cope with natural 
disasters; and in what way does the aftermath of these disasters affect the islands’ constitutional ties? 
These questions will be central in this thesis.
The  above  mentioned  islands  are  in  the  literature  often  revered  to  as  Sub  National  Island 
Jurisdictions, or SNIJs1. This name is used because even though these small island states have different 
political affiliations with different countries, they share the traits of being small, both in size and in 
population,  and being an island. The political  affiliations range from completely integrated islands, 
such as the French dependencies, to loose associations, such as the British territories of Montserrat, 
Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. Obviously, there are also independent small island states. The 
country of St. Kitts and Nevis can be seen as a representative of these type of small islands. However, 
the country is not a SNIJs, since it is an independent country and therefore not sub-national. 
 The SNIJs are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, mainly due to their size and location. 
One powerful hurricane can wreak havoc to entire islands, affecting all of its inhabitants, buildings and 
infrastructure. These disasters can range from hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes to floods. 
In terms of human resources, small entities often lack the manpower, in quantity and/or quality, to 
provide a range of services which are vital in the event of natural disasters. These include emergency 
personnel, such as an adequate police force, fire-fighters and medical professionals. 
In addition,  being a  small  island state  causes a  range of  other  potential  weaknesses.  These 
entities can be extremely vulnerable to  economic change,  since they often do not  poses  a  diverse 
economy with many different branches (i.e. diversification). Instead, they rely largely - especially in 
the Lesser Antilles - on tourists for the brunt of their income. The tourist-sector is in general the first 
'victim' of economic decline (also of natural disasters). In the political spectrum, it is often hard for 
these entities to supply manpower or even funds, to be truly active in the diplomatic arena. Due to their  
size, they are often incapable of defending themselves militarily, as was the case with the invasion of 
Grenada by the USA in 1983. Moreover, small island-states often lack strategic goods and need to 
1 G. Baldacchino and D. Milne, The Case for Non-Sovereignty, lessons from sub-national island jurisdictions (London 
2009), 4.
import these, potentially causing them to be dependent on a supplier. 
Taking all these disadvantages into account, it can be very beneficial for a small island entity to 
be affiliated to  a larger, and more wealthy metropolis (which usually are former colonizers). A 
metropole can potentially lend assistance in case of all of the aforementioned weaknesses. The main 
topic for this paper will therefore be how the constitutional status has affected the ability of SNIJs to 
cope with natural-disasters. The  aim  is  to  compare  SNIJs  and  independent  islands  in  the  Lesser 
Antilles, and determine how different constitutional relationships have affected disaster-management 
since the era of decolonization and, subsequently, if disasters have affected constitutional relationships. 
I choose the Lesser Antilles as my topic first of all because it covers wide variety of differing political 
entities. A second reason is the high frequency and severity of natural disasters in the area. Finally,  the 
fact that the  islands are of comparable size makes the research more feasible  (small enough that an 
entire island will be affected by natural disasters).
 
Before discussing the research question into more detail,  the theoretical framework requires 
more attention. As Fritz remarked half a century ago, communities and societies that have repeatedly 
and recently experienced the same kind of disaster become best prepared and organized to deal with it.2 
The repeated impact of a same disaster may even lead to the emergence of a  disaster management  
culture within a society. This culture can subsequently be sub-divided into three generic aspects: first, 
the  societal  aspect,  which is  the  ability  of  people to  cope with disasters,  this  mainly includes  the 
awareness and preparedness of the population in respect to disasters. Second, the institutional aspect, 
which refers to the ability of local institutions to cope with disasters. In other words, are there disaster 
plans,  is  the  population  adequately  informed,  are  there,  for  example,  any  disaster-response  teams 
available?  And  concerning  the  aftermath,  are  the  institutions  or  local  politicians  able  to  generate 
enough funds to do adequate recovery activities, and maybe even able to improve construction. Which 
leads to the last aspect, the technological aspect. The latter includes physical disaster preparedness, like 
adequate housing and sea-walls.
The 'constitutional make-up' determines to a great extent the institutional aspect of a society’s 
disaster culture.  SNIJs that are affiliated to a metropole, tend to receive substantial  aid to improve 
institutions which engage in disaster-management. Therefore, it makes sense in the present paper to 
focus on the institutional aspects of disaster management cultures. In addition to this, the institutions 
can also have a big or even determining influence on the cultural and technological aspects, because the 
adequate  conduct  of  the  institutions  can  lead  to  adequate  disaster  preparedness  on  the  cultural 
(individual  disaster  awareness/preparedness)  and  as  well  on  the  technological  (is  construction 
adequately  disaster-proof?)  level.  Conversely,  these  two  aspects,  cultural  and  technological,  when 
researched properly, can show the state of the institutions. 
My approach will  be to  determine how governmental  institutions  have handled the  advent, 
occurrence  and  aftermath  of  natural  disasters.  This  can  be  done  by  researching  how  disaster 
management was shaped on the three above mentioned levels. Primary sources like newspapers or 
dedicated  disaster  research (of  individual  disasters)  by disaster  experts  will  form the  basis  of  this 
research. By investigating different natural disasters, one can determine whether disaster management 
has changed during the course of the  post  Second  World  War  era.  And  how successful  disaster-
management  has  been concerning each entity,  and,  conversely,  whether  disasters  have  changed or 
influenced the constitutional ties between the entities and their respective metropoles. 
First it is necessary to establish what a disaster actually is. Is there a difference between natural 
disasters and human, or man-made disasters? And why is a historical approach towards disasters 
required? Subsequently, it is important to point out that there are many different kinds of disasters. 
Which disaster-types have struck the Lesser Antilles? After establishing which disasters have struck the 
2 Charles, E. Fritz, 'Disaster' in: Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems, An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Deviant Behavior and Social Disorganization (New York 1961) 659.
region it is time to choose the islands which will be the subject of the following case-studies, which 
will comprise the following four chapters. These decisions will be justified according to the idea that 
each political constellation (the three metropoles and a sovereign) should be represented and that these 
entities should share one specific disaster-type. That is to say, a disaster-type which struck all the 
selected islands and with more or less comparable severity. This is important to do actual comparative 
research on disasters. 
At present there are still three European metropoles which have a relationship with a number of 
dependencies in the Lesser Antilles. These are France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. There 
are also a number of  independent island-states in the area. I will leave the US’ dependencies Puerto 
Rico and the US Virgin Islands out of the equation in an effort to narrow the scope. 
I will divide this paper in two parts. In the first part I will focus on hurricanes that have struck 
Saint Martin since World War II. This island has the remarkable feature that it is divided in two parts: 
the southern part is affiliated to the Netherlands and the northern part is an integral part of France. Each 
hurricane will be researched in three parts. First, the predisaster period will be investigated. In this 
section I  will  try to discover  to what  extent  the island was prepared for disasters.  Were there,  for 
example, disaster plans, and was the population aware of the potential devastation that can be inflicted 
by a natural disaster? In short, was there any disaster preparation going on before the occurrence of a 
natural disaster? Second, I will examine the immediate recovery procedure. Who was active during the 
disaster relief period? Were the local populations and authorities able to recover by themselves? Was 
help provided by the metropolis  or  other  countries? Did NGOs play a  large part  in  the recovery? 
Finally, in the same vein, I will research the recovery process. Again it is asked, who were crucial 
players concerning long term recovery? The inhabitants themselves? Or did the islands depend mainly 
on aid from overseas? To initiate the comparative approach, I will first compare the Dutch response to 
hurricane Luis, with the response of the same hurricane on the French part; Saint Martin. 
In the second part of this paper I will put the Dutch experiences in a broader perspective. I will 
research  how Montserrat,  which  is  a  dependency  of  the  UK,  and  Saint  Kitts-Nevis,  which  is  an 
independent country, have responded to hurricanes. In particular I will examine how these two entities 
have coped with hurricane Hugo. I will use the same approach to research Hugo as will done with 
regard to the hurricanes that affected Saint Martin. Thus I will have four case studies. In the conclusion, 
these cases can be compared and the main questions can be answered. The answers will hopefully 
allow an evaluation as to which constitutional form is the most adequate in relation to disaster-
management and whether disasters have caused metropoles to change their relationship with their 
dependencies. 
 
1 Defining disasters
In this chapter I will first examine what a natural disaster actually is, and what the difference is 
between hazards and disasters.  Furthermore, the difference between natural and man-made disasters is 
discussed.  Next, it is important to point out why a historical approach towards disaster research is 
required. Thereafter I will investigate which types of disaster have been common in the Lesser Antilles 
since WW II. To achieve this I will present an  inventory of  the disasters which have hit the Lesser 
Antilles since 1945. After the creation of this inventory, it is time to decide and justify which islands 
will be the subject of the case-studies. This will be done by the methodology which is explained in the 
introduction. 
1.1 What is a disaster?
In general we can state that there is a difference between a  hazard and a disaster and, 
subsequently, disasters are subdivided into natural disasters and human or man-made disasters. First, 
we must define the difference between hazards and disasters, and in doing so we can also define these 
terms individually. Although the terms are often used synonymously, according to Ms. Garcia-Acosta, 
hazard refers to the agent and disaster to the process in which the agent and specific physical, social, 
and economic factors participate: what really constitutes a disaster, then, is the combination of a 
destructive agent from the natural and/or man-made environment and a group of human beings living 
in a specific local socio-cultural context.3 Thus, disasters can be viewed as the result of an encounter 
between hazards and people who are vulnerable, not just physically, but also economically, socially, 
politically, and/or culturally.4 
Second, what is the difference between natural and human disasters? The former is caused by 
nature itself and is often regarded as an uncontrollable phenomenon to which only a certain level of 
preparedness is to be reached. The latter is perceived as being caused by humans themselves and 
therefore, at least in personal experience, avoidable and a type of disaster to which one can more or less 
adequately prepare for. Natural disasters can include hurricanes, earthquakes, landslides, floods, 
droughts and volcanic eruptions. Man-made disasters can range from famine to war and include 
industrial or technological disasters. 
However tempting, the division between natural and man-made disasters seems inappropriate. 
This is due to the fact that the effects of natural disasters can be worsened by man. For example, when 
the 1985 earthquake hit Mexico-city, its epicenter was over 200 miles from the capital. However, cheap 
construction and the digging of huge wells for the ever growing water demand, increased the severity 
of the catastrophe. Likewise, deforestation can cause harmful landslides when the soil is exposed to 
heavy rain. Lastly,  the rising sea-levels may seem a natural phenomenon, but is often attributed to 
increasing CO2 levels which, at least in part, is probably caused by man. 
Another reason why this division seems false, is because  in essence there  can be made  no 
distinction between human and non-human  nature. Some researchers suggest that even ‘natural’ 
disasters are most often man-made in the sense that their catastrophic effects on human populations 
depend on social and economic problems of vulnerability and the unequal distribution of risk.5 Like 
mentioned before,  a disaster may unveil the degree of inequality that already exists within a society. 
3 Virginia Garcia-Acosta 'Historical Disaster Research' in: Susanne M. Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith, Catastrophe 
and Culture, The Anthropology of Disaster (Santa Fe 2002) 57.
4 Ibidem, 56.
5 Mark D. Anderson, Disaster Writing, The Cultural Politics of Catastrophe in Latin America (Virginia 2011) 28.
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From a more theoretical point of view, disaster is defined as the negative to normalcy and normalcy is 
socially defined, not natural.6 In this sense, both disaster and nature are socially constructed human 
concepts. To avoid ambiguity, historians should use the more precise alternative term: nature-induced 
disaster, which reflects the fact that catastrophes are brought about by natural phenomena without 
obscuring their anthropogenic dimensions.7 Which is the term that will be used in this paper. 
1.2 Historical approach
It is important to point out why a historical approach towards nature-induced disasters is 
necessary. Historians have long neglected or misinterpreted the occurrence of nature-induced disasters. 
However understandable, the view that a disaster is like a bee, “it stings once and than it dies” seems 
false. Nature-induced disasters are often not incidental and the advent or incidence of such catastrophes 
has  at least had as  much effect on certain societies as wars or political turmoil. For example, many 
communities have been shaped by the threat of floods, which encouraged these communities to work 
together to make sure that they would keep dry feet. Indeed, even nature-induced disasters which have 
been incidental, like earthquakes or famine, have exercised an influence on the course of human history 
and culture that can hardly be overestimated.8 
One example, which is also mentioned above, of a nature-induced disaster which changed the 
course of an entire country is the massive earthquake that left a part of Mexico City in ruins, including 
a large number of government buildings.  This catastrophe led to the collapse of Mexico's “perfect 
dictatorship”. The disaster created solidarity among Mexican citizens, strengthened civil society and 
the  political  self-consciousness  of  a  repressed  population,  and with  one  stroke  made  manifest  the 
impotence of a regime that was unequipped to conduct critical rescue and recovery operations.9  The 
catastrophe unveiled the true state of the regime, like many other disasters of similar magnitude have 
shown in other countries, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the United Stated, the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake in China, the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and the 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear meltdown occurring in Japan. The problems these nations faced were similar: a 
lack  of  emergency  preparedness,  social  inequalities  and  construction  practices  that  increased 
vulnerability,  tardiness  in  initiating the rescue effort,  challenges  in  providing adequate  support  for 
survivors, accusations of corruption in the handling of emergency funds and donations, and frustrations 
with leadership.10
In contrast to the purely destructive traits of nature-induce disasters, they can also be 'used' by 
people in power to legitimize or initiate certain ideas or reforms. Just like many wars were started to 
distract tensions at home, nature-induced disasters can be used as lightning rods for internal turmoil.  
Wars and disasters  can have unifying traits  which can be used by people in  power.  Disasters  can 
likewise legitimize or initiate certain actions of a government. The hurricane that struck the Dominican 
Republic on September 2 and 3, 1930 was such a disaster. 
Only  16  days  after  Rafael  Leonidas  Trujillo11 had  been  inaugurated  as  the  leader  of  the 
Dominican Republic,  a hurricane passed over the capital,  causing unprecedented damage. The new 
6 Ibidem, 28. 
7 Christian Pfister, 'Learning from Nature-induced Disasters: Theoretical Considerations and Case Studies from Western 
Europe' in: Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister, Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses, Case Studies Towards a Global 
Environmental History (Lanham, 2009) 18. 
8 Christian Mauch, 'Introduction' in: Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister, Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses 
(Lanham, 2009) 3.
9 Ibidem, 4.
10 Mark D. Anderson, Disaster Writing, 148. 
11 Ibidem, 29. 
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regime saw its response to the hurricane as the first step in constructing a “magnificent new nation” 
that would leave behind its catastrophic past. According to Mark Anderson, the author of the book 
“Disaster Writing”, nature-induced disaster exercised a triple function in the regime's politics: “first, as 
a  proving ground in which Trujillo  could demonstrate  the effectiveness  of  his  leadership abilities; 
second, as an experimental laboratory for the totalitarian policies that he would later implement (...); 
and third, as a platform for the construction of [a] new national psychology that would replace the 
defeatism  that,  according  to  [Trujillo's]  analysis  of  the  nation's  history,  had  characterized  the 
Dominican  collective  consciousness  since  colonial  times.”12 The  use,  or  usurpation,  of  a  disaster 
supports the idea that the aftermath of a catastrophe can have a transformative “phoenix effect” 13 with 
respect to society. Indeed, in the years that followed, Trujillo and his collaborators used his response to 
Cyclone San Zenon (which would be the name henceforth used for the hurricane) as a key trope in the 
narrative legitimizing his rule, which lasted form 1930 until his death in 1961.14
Bearing in mind that Anderson centers specifically on disasters as a force to be reckoned with, 
concerning the cause of human or political history, he points out that few works, that deal with the 
Trujillato, refer to the 1930 hurricane at all. This notion fits in the idea that the impact of disasters on 
history is still largely neglected. 
Mike Davis shares this point of view in his book “Late Victorian Holocausts”. He points out 
that:  “almost  without  exception,  modern  historians  (including  Eric  Hobsbawn and  David  Landes) 
writing  about  nineteenth-century  world  history  have  ignored  the  late  Victorian  mega-droughts  and 
famines that engulfed what we now call the “third world”.”15 These disasters, or series of disasters, 
caused  the  deaths  of  millions.  It  is  like  writing  the  history  of  the  late  twentieth  century  without 
mentioning the Great Leap forward famine or the Cambodia's killing fields.16 The great famine of the 
late Victorian era was, according to Davis, in part caused by man. Extreme climatic conditions in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth-century coincided at a moment in history when the labor and products of 
tropical humanity were being dynamically conscripted into a London-centered world economy.17 Davis 
points out that in this new economy grain-speculators and colonial proconsuls determined the price of 
grain and other foodstuffs, resulting in people dying within close proximity of actual food storages.   
In contrast to other disciplines, historians have at their disposal a set of methodological tools 
that enables them to reflect the entire scope of human interaction with nature, including political and 
institutional ramifications, socially produced perceptions, and historically variable anxieties, as well as 
social and economic damage.18 The fact that current disaster research is “clearly lacking in temporal 
depth”19 makes it important to point out the strength of the historical approach: it has the capacity to 
acknowledge both the immediacy of the catastrophe – its sudden incidence, and the tragedy of the day 
– and the long-term effects of these incidents.20 
1.3 Inventory
 Now we need to inventory which disaster-types have struck the Lesser Antilles since the 
Second World War. This inventory will help to justify the choice of a disaster-type which has inflicted 
12 Ibidem, 34. 
13 Christian Mauch, 'Introduction' in: Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister, Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses, 6. 
14 Mark D. Anderson, Disaster Writing,, 29. 
15 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, El Nino Famines and the making of the Third World (London, 2001) 8. 
16 Ibidem, 8.
17 Ibidem, 9.
18 Christian Mauch, 'Introduction' in: Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister, Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses, 6
19 Ibidem, 5.
20 Ibidem, 6.
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significant damage to the Lesser Antilles.
A useful source to inventory disasters is EM-DAT, which stands for Emergency Events 
Database.21 It is compiled by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and is 
one of the most comprehensive publicly available databases on natural disasters. EM-DAT was created 
with the initial support of the WHO and the Belgian government and it is based at the University of 
Leuven. The main objective of the database is to support humanitarian action at national and 
international levels.22 EM-DAT contains data of disasters form the year 1900 to the present. EM-DAT 
distinguishes two generic categories for disasters, natural and technological.23 Technological disasters 
have no sub-divisions. Nature-induced disasters are sub-divided as is illustrated in table 1.1: 
Table 1.124
Table 1.1 shows how disasters can be sub-divided into separate groups. Now we can find out 
which disaster-types have struck the Lesser Antilles since WW II and how severe these have been. If 
we use EM-DAT to create a table which lists the number of nature-induced disasters that occurred by 
disaster type in the entire Caribbean since 1940, and a number of criteria which indicate how severe 
certain disaster-types have been, we get the following results: 
Table 1.2. Disaster-types, since 1940 in the entire Caribbean (Source: EM-DAT)
21 www.emdat.be
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem.
24 Ibidem.
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Sub-Group Definition Disaster Main Type
Geophysical Events originating from solid earth Earthquake, Volcano, Mass movement 
Meteorological Storm
Hydrological Flood, mass movement (wet)
Climatological Extreme Temperature, Drought, Wildfire
Biological Epidemic, Insect infestation, Stampede
Events caused by short-lived/small to 
meso scale atmospheric processes (in 
the spectrum from minutes to days)
Events caused by deviations in the 
normal water cycle and/or overflow of 
bodies of water caused by wind set-up
Events caused by long-lived/meso to 
macro scale processes (in the 
spectrum from intra-seasonal to multi-
decadal climate variability)
Disaster caused by the exposure of 
living organisms to germs and toxic 
substances
Disaster Type Number Deaths Total affected (,000) Damage in US $ (,000)
Drought 23 0 3540 197639
Earthquake 12 222655 3708 8045000
Flood 117 517 4160 827382
Mass movement wet / landslides 6 390 2,4 0
Storm 283 16757 21315 35175896
Volcano 8 34 110 8000
It is clear that since the 1940s storms and floods have been the most frequent disaster-types in 
the region. The huge death toll concerning the earthquake disaster-type is mainly due to the earthquake 
which hit Haiti in 2010. A catastrophic disaster in scale, it is out of the scope of this paper, since Haiti 
is not a part of the Lesser Antilles. Taking this fact into account, it is obvious that storms, or hurricanes, 
are the most destructive nature-induced disasters in the Caribbean, given the number of total affected 
(which is the sum of people who required immediate assistance during a disaster, like people who were 
injured, displaced or became homeless), and the sustained damage, which is over $ 35 billion due to 
storms since the 1940s. I will mainly focus on storms, or hurricanes because these disaster-types have 
been severe enough to ensure the occurrence of disaster-relief efforts and because hurricanes have the 
habit of hitting multiple islands or areas, thus enabling comparative research. 
1.4 Selecting island-states
 Since the specific idea of the present study is to compare islands with different constitutional 
make-up, it makes sense to select those nature-induced disasters which have hit multiple islands in the 
Lesser Antilles. Hurricane Hugo, which struck the Lesser Antilles in 1989, meets this criterion  (see 
map 1). 
 Map 1. Path of hurricane Hugo (1989)25
It severely hit the islands of Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Martin. For this paper, 
each metropole and a sovereign entity should at least have one 'representative' entity. Antigua and 
Montserrat are both affiliated with the United Kingdom. Of the two I choose Montserrat, since more 
data is available for that island.
Subsequently, I select St Kitts and Nevis as the representative entity for the sovereign nations in 
the region. As stated, the subject for the first part of this study will be the Dutch part of St. Maarten 
25 Map found on July 23, 2012 at: http://www.unesco.org/csi/act/cosalc/hur8.htm
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and, subsequently, the response of the French part of Saint Martin to hurricane Luis. The fact that 
nature-induced disasters do not care for political borders makes St. Martin an excellent research 
subject. Multiple hurricanes have hit the island during our time frame, with one hurricane, Luis, 
sticking out. In 1995, Luis damaged or destroyed almost 90 percent of the buildings on St. Martin. All 
three islands are selected on the basis of two criteria. First, they were all struck by the same nature-
induced disaster: hurricanes and in particular by hurricane Hugo. This allows for better comparison 
because time-dependent differences will thus be minimized.26 Second, all islands experienced moderate 
to heavy damage, ensuring significant recovery activity.
26 P. R. Berke and T. Beatley, After the Hurricane, Linking Recovery to Sustainable Development in the Caribbean 
(London, 1997) 20.
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2 Hurricanes on Saint Martin 
The first part of this study will be about the Dutch part of Saint Martin, or  Sint Maarten  in 
Dutch. With regard to hurricane Luis, as mentioned above, I will also research the response of the 
French part. 
First, it is necessary to establish what kind of constitutional options are available in theory. This 
will  also  be  a  useful  guide for  the  remaining  case-studies.  To  establish  a  starting  point,  I  will 
subsequently investigate what kind of constitutional shape St. Maarten has had since decolonization 
began after  the Second World War.  In other words,  what  was the constitutional  relationship of St. 
Maarten with the Netherlands Antilles, and what was the relationship with the Netherlands?  
Thereafter, I will focus on a particular disaster in three stages. 
Stage one: the predisaster period. In this section, I will initially examine the constitutional ties 
with regard to disaster-management. The question asked in this part is to what extent institutions on St.  
Maarten relied on assistance from the metropolis concerning disaster-management? In other words, 
who controlled the disaster-management institutions and who payed for them? And, subsequently, how 
did the disaster-management institutions operate? Have they increased disaster awareness amongst the 
population?  Were  there  any disaster  plans?  Were  there  building  codes?  In  short,  was  the  disaster 
preparedness on the island adequately arranged? 
Second, I will describe the disaster preparations during the advent of the actual disaster. Who 
was involved in the disaster preparation activities? Did local institutions and organizations take an 
active part in the disaster preparations? Or have the people relied on aid from the Netherlands Antilles' 
government, the Dutch government, or NGOs? 
Stage two: impact. What was the actual damage caused by a specific disaster, in terms of human 
casualties and overall damage to buildings and the local infrastructure. 
Stage three: recovery. First, in what way was the immediate recovery process undertaken? Who 
was  active  and  who  paid  for  the  recovery  activities?  Local  (St.  Maarten),  national  (Netherlands 
Antilles), Dutch, or international governments and/or organizations? 
Second, in a similar vein with respect to predisaster period, I will examine how the long term 
recovery took place and which institutions took part in it. Did disaster preparedness on St. Maarten 
intensify? And if so, in what manner was this done? Did local institutions receive additional aid from 
the  Netherlands  Antilles,  the  Dutch  or  international  governments  and/or  organizations?  The 
constitutional ties will especially be investigated. Has the aftermath of a specific disaster changed the 
constitutional  ties  with  the  Netherlands?  To  put  it  differently,  have  disasters  caused  the  Dutch 
government to intensify or relax their relationship with St. Maarten and/or the Netherlands Antilles? 
2.1 Constitutional status 
The options concerning constitutional status range from total integration to full independence of 
a (former) colony or SNIJ. A referendum held in October 1993 in the United States Virgin Islands 
(USVI),  also  situated  in  the  Lesser  Antilles,  illustrates  some of  the  options.  Each category  in  the 
referendum contained several specific statutory arrangements, which citizens would consider once a 
majority had decided on the general direction of the territory's legal evolution.27 The three possibilities 
were:
1. complete integration into the United States through accession to statehood or by becoming an 
27 Robert Aldrich and John Connell, The Last Colonies (Cambridge 1998) 16. 
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incorporated territory
2. continued or enhanced territorial status through a compact of federal relations, the adoption of 
legislation making the USVI a commonwealth or the continuation of the status quo, with the 
islands remaining an unincorporated territory; 
3. withdrawal  of United States sovereignty,  with the USVI gaining complete  independence or 
retaining ties with Washington through a treaty of free association.28 
Another option would be complete integration into another state, however, this was inconceivable for 
the citizens of the USVI. A final possibility would have been the creation of a multi-state federation. 
One (short-lived) example  of this was the British attempt to set up a West Indian Federation in the 
Caribbean in 1958, which should have included all British territories in the West Indies. In general, the 
three  categories can be summarized as follows: 1. Complete integration into the mother country; 2. 
Status quo, or a (con)federal association; 3. Complete sovereignty, possibly extended with a treaty. 
Each  of  the  entities  discussed  in  this  paper  have  a  different  constitutional  status.  I  now turn  my 
attention to the Dutch part of St. Maarten. 
The decolonization process of the Dutch empire started directly after the Second World War in 
the Dutch East Indies.  After a prolonged struggle between the Dutch and the people of the newly 
formed state of Indonesia, independence was granted by the Netherlands in 1949. In an effort to keep 
close ties with its former colony, the Dutch tried to create a union between its (former) colonies and the 
Netherlands. The  effort  was  focused  on  creating  a  commonwealth  in  which  the  Netherlands  and 
Indonesia would still have close relations. But, Indonesia proved to be uninterested in such a sort of 
associated statehood. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  in  the  West  Indies,  which  was  insignificant  compared  to 
Indonesia in many Dutch eyes, the idea of a union did not die with the independence of Indonesia. The 
Dutch decided to create two entities which would be unified with the Netherlands in the Kingdom of  
the Netherlands. One entity was Suriname and the other was the Netherlands Antilles, which comprised 
all of the Dutch islands in the Caribbean sea; Aruba, Curacao and Bonaire, in the southern Caribbean,  
and St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba in the north-eastern Caribbean. 
The  Statuut,  or Charter of the Kingdom, which defined the new constellation, was signed by 
Queen Juliana in the Hague on December 15, 1954. The Charter heralded a new era in the trans-
Atlantic  relationship.  According  to  the  preamble  of  the  Charter  the  Kingdom partners  voluntarily 
declared “to accept a new legal order in which they take care of their own interests autonomously, 
manage communal affairs on an equal footing, and accord each other assistance.”29 It further stated that 
the Crown would be the head of state and that it  would be represented by governors in each of two 
countries.  The Charter  defined foreign policy,  defence,  citizenship,  and the safeguarding of  proper 
governmental administration as matters of common interest to be governed by the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.  In  fact  this  kingdom government  was simply  delineated as  the  ruling  Dutch  cabinet,  
expanded to  include  one  plenipotentiary  minister  for  each  of  the  Caribbean  territories.30 This  still 
reflects the 'democratic deficit'31 of the Kingdom, in the sense that it has a government, but lacks a 
corresponding parliament.
28 Ibidem, 17. 
29 Preamble of the Charter of the Kingdom, http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002154/  geldigheidsdatum  _02-05-2012  
30 Oostindie, G. 'Island jurisdictions of the Dutch Caribbean' in: Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne, The Case for Non-
Sovereignty, Lessons from Sub-National Island Jurisdictions (London 2009) 125.
31 Oostindie, G and Klinkers, I. Knellende Koninkrijksbanden, Het Nederlandse dekolonisatiebeleid in de Caraïben, 1940-
2000 [deel III](Amsterdam 2001) 409.
13
It is hard to phrase this new constitutional form in conventional terms. The federal and unitary 
traits that the text of the Charter exhibits, are no more than constitutional make-up.32 The Kingdom 
functions more like a confederation, although it cannot be called that either, because it is not based on a 
treaty, the Countries are not independent states, and the organs of the Kingdom do have some - albeit 
very limited - power over the citizens of the Countries. The structure of the Kingdom does not fit any 
of the other traditional forms of government. It is usually called a construction sui generis, but it could 
also be called a “constitutional  association” or  a “cooperative structure governed by constitutional 
law”33 It can also be described as a middle path between two extremes, on the one hand full sovereignty 
could have been granted, or, on the other hand, complete integration in the metropolis as a province 
was  an  option.  These  options  were  never  seriously  considered  by  all  three  parties  during  the 
negotiations of the Charter. 
Thus, concerning the above mentioned constitutional options, the Charter of 1954 meant for St. 
Maarten that it now was an integral part of the Netherlands Antilles, and had a loose constitutional 
association with the Netherlands under the umbrella of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. At least in 
theory, Sint Maarten could count on assistance of its Kingdom-partners - in particular of the wealthy 
Netherlands - in case of an emergency. 
2.2 Hurricanes
Fourteen major hurricanes and tropical storms have hit St. Maarten during the post war era, 
which are listed in the diagram below. 
       Diagram 1.1 Hurricanes that struck St. Maarten34 (missing information is due to a lack of data) 
Since the late 1980s the frequency and intensity of hurricanes has in general increased. The 'Atlantic 
hurricane season' is an annual phenomenon, which lasts from June 1 to November 30. However, some 
32 Hillebrink, S. Political Decolonization and Self-Determination, The Case of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
(Zutphen 2007) 186.  
33 Hillebrink, S. Political Decolonization and Self-Determination, 337.
34 Www.emdat.be
14
Year Name Damage (000 Fl.) Killed Homeless
1950 Dog
1955 Alice 60
1960 Donna 5000 7 >25 % of population
1966 Faith
1989 Hugo
1995 Luis 1000000 14 1000
1995 Marilyn
1996 Bertha
1998 Georges
1999 Jose 1
1999 Lenny 13
2000 Debby
2008 Omar
hurricanes or tropical storms have occurred outside of this season. Four hurricanes will be reviewed in 
this chapter; Alice (1955), Donna (1960), Hugo (1989) and Luis (1995). 
2.2.1 Hurricanes Alice and Donna
The first indication of how nature-induced disasters on St. Maarten were dealt with,  is to be 
found in a newspaper from Curacao, the Amigoe di Curacao. It reports the occurrence of hurricane 
'Alice', which struck the Leeward Island (if not mentioned otherwise, by Leeward islands I refer to the 
the Dutch Leeward islands, or SSS-islands; Saba St. Eustatius (Statia) and St. Maarten)  on January 
third, 1955. Although the damage to St. Maarten was minimal, Saba was severely hit, especially its 
roads. There were no reports of casualties. During the next morning a committee was formed in 
Willemstad, the former capital of the Netherlands Antilles, situated on Curacao. It was led by Mr. 
Lopes, who was a member of the Staten, the parliament of the Netherlands Antilles. This committee 
had the goal to start with the relief effort immediately.35 There was a rumor that a Dutch navy ship was 
asked to supply Saba with provisions, but this was not confirmed. After a week long trip to the 
Leeward Islands Mr Lopes reported that Hfl. 60.000,-36 was required to aid the population. These funds 
should be raised by means of charity. Illustrative is the fact that the C.P.I.M /  C.S.M donated Hfl. 
17.000,-.37 (C.P.I.M / C.S.M stood for Curaçaosche Petroleum Industrie Maatschappij / Curaçaosche 
Scheepvaart Maatschappij, which stand for Curacao Petrol Industrial Company and Curacao Shipping 
Company. There was a major oil refinery on Curacao, which employed a large part of the local 
population). This donation was the result of a fund raising activity amongst its employees. These facts 
indicate that there were no, or little disaster-relief funds available, or an unwillingness to provide in it. 
It seems like there was practically no discussion about hurricane Alice in the Dutch parliament. 
Although a little more than a year after the hurricane struck a Dutch parliamentary delegation did visit 
the struck islands from January 19th until the 30th, including St. Maarten, there was, however, no talk 
about the aftermath of hurricane Alice.38
The next hurricane to be reviewed is Donna. It hit St. Maarten on the September fourth, 1960.39 
It caused 2 deaths. According to gezaghebber Beaujon of St. Maarten (a gezaghebber is comparable to 
a Dutch mayor): “hardly any building has remained undamaged”.40 In addition, a bridge was destroyed 
and the airport was rendered useless due to the damage, also prohibiting radio traffic. The damage was 
estimated  on Hfl.  5  million.  The damage sustained to  private  property  was estimated  on Hfl.  1,5 
Million.  The Dutch government offered aid within two days. On the sixth of September prime minister 
Jonkheer of the Netherlands promised help for the affected island.41 The  other  Kingdom-partner, 
Suriname,  also  offered  aid  to  St.  Maarten  in  particular.  Financial  aid  was  necessary,  since  the 
35 Amigoe di Curacao: Weekblad voor de Curaçaosche eilanden, January 4, 1955. 
36 Ibidem, January 15 1955.
37 Ibidem, February 16 1955.
38 A description of the journey conducted by Dutch parliament members to St. Maarten, July 19, 1955, 
http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/document?id=sgd%3A19551956%3A0000942andzoekopdracht%5Bvergaderjaar
%5D%5Bvan%5D=1953+-+1954andzoekopdracht%5Bvergaderjaar%5D%5Btot  %5D=1955+-+1956andzoekopdracht  
%5Bzoekwoorden%5D=sint+maartenandzoekopdracht%5Bkamer%5D%5B0%5D=Eerste+Kamerandzoekopdracht
%5Bkamer%5D%5B1%5D=Tweede+Kamerandzoekopdracht%5Bkamer%5D
%5B2%5D=Verenigde+Vergaderingandzoekopdracht%5Bkamer%5D%5B3%5D=UCV%2FOCVandzoekopdracht
%5BdocumentType%5D=Alle+document+typesandzoekopdracht%5Bpagina%5D=1andzoekopdracht%5Bsortering
%5D=relevantieandpagina=2andzoom=0.5andhighlights=aan 
39 Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, September 5 1960. 
40 Ibidem, September 7, 1960.
41 Nieuw Suriname: Surinaams nieuws- en advertentieblad, September 7 1960. 
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government of the Netherlands Antilles was coping with a lack of funds and could not compensate the 
total damage.  The Netherlands Antilles government in Curacao responded to the disaster by sending 
observers to St. Maarten, indicating that there probably was no disaster-plan which could be put into 
operation immediately. 
In the Netherlands, a fund raising campaign was initiated, headed by the Dutch Red Cross and 
the Dutch fund for the Netherlands Antilles (Nederlands Steunfonds voor de Nederlandse Antillen).42 
The Dutch government encouraged this campaign. On September 14 vice-premier Korthals gave a 
radio speech in which he stated that the provisional estimates of the total damage caused by Donna was 
around Hfl. 5 million. He concluded with saying; “I hope that everyone will be committed to make this 
action successful,”43 referring to the fund raising campaign. Worth of note is the fact that the phone 
connection between the Dutch and the French parts were not operational until March 19, 1966, almost 
six years after the catastrophe.44 
Hurricane Donna (often referred to as “Donnah” in the Dutch parliament) was discussed in both 
chambers of the Dutch parliament. The support of the Netherlands to St. Maarten was deemed to be 
evidence of the excellent relationship between the Netherlands and its Caribbean Kingdom-partners 
and St. Maarten' lasting status as a part of the Kingdom.45 At the same time, it is striking that the better 
part of the Dutch aid was provided by private charity efforts.46 Whether any aid is provided by the 
Dutch government was not discussed in parliament.
St. Maarten and the Netherlands Antilles were not adequately prepared to the onslaught of both 
hurricanes. Preparations were minimal and lacked any serious disaster-planning prior to the storm. The 
relief effort tended to be ad hoc and slow. The Dutch government tended to rely on charities from the 
populations of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles for its relief effort. They did focus on the 
importance of the ties between the two Kingdom-partners,  but  this  statement  can be seen as a lip 
service and not as real support to a part of the kingdom that was in need. 
2.2.2 Hurricane Hugo
Preparations
Hugo  was  first  reported  by  the  Amigoe on  September  14th,  1989.  By  the  16th,  disaster 
preparations were well  under way on the Leeward islands.  Since hurricane Donna in  1960, which 
caused thousands of casualties throughout the Caribbean, there had been major improvements in the 
early-warning systems.47 In general people were therefore warned on time for Hurricane Hugo. On St. 
Maarten many buildings were strengthened to cope with potential  strong winds. Hotels engaged in 
serious and reasonably organized disaster preparedness. Many yachts and other ships were kept in the 
inner  waters,  because  huge  waves  could  destroy  them  in  the  outer  waters.  These  waves,  it  was 
predicted, could probably render large sections of the island impassable, and could wash away large 
sections of beaches.48 Lower areas were evacuated and everybody was urged to stay indoors. Local 
authorities, the Dutch Navy and the Red Cross were asked to prepare for an emergency. If St. Maarten 
42 Ibidem, September 12 1960.  
43 Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, September 15 1960. 
44 Amigoe di Curacao, September 19 1966.
45 26th meeting Eerste Kamer, March 28, 1961, 
http://resourcessgd.kb.nl/SGD/19601961/PDF/SGD_19601961_0000027.pdf
46 33th meeting Tweede Kamer, December 20, 1960,
http://resourcessgd.kb.nl/SGD/19601961/PDF/SGD_19601961_0000167.pdf 
47 Algemeen Dagblad, September 18, 1989. 
48 Amigoe di Curacao, September 14, 1989.
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would ask for help, it could receive immediate aid from these institutions. 
Impact
Hugo struck St. Martin on September 17, 1989. Although the hurricane passed the SSS-islands 
at a distance of 75 km, the damage caused by the hurricane was extensive and estimated on Hfl. 12 
million.  The  first  reports  indicated  that  houses  had  collapsed,  roofs  were  torn  off,  and  trees  and 
telephone poles had been ripped out of the ground.49 This caused all phone connections to be broken 
with St. Maarten. A huge tidal wave had ruined large sections of beaches. Multiple yachts, which were 
kept safe in the Simpson Bay lagoon, sustained significant damage. The runway of the Juliana airport 
on St. Maarten was completely destroyed. Marines tried to get the airport operational again. Additional 
medical personal and material were bound to be flown in, as soon as the runway was cleared. The port 
facilities sustained major damage on St. Maarten. There were no serious injuries, however between 200 
and  250 people  became homeless.  Hotels  and  holiday  homes  received  extensive  damage  or  were 
completely  destroyed.  Philipsburg,  the  capital  of  Dutch  St.  Maarten,  was confronted  with  looting. 
Because the police was providing people with first aid, it was advised to businessman to keep their 
shops closed and have them guarded. The St. Maarten Red Cross did request additional personnel, but 
was in  general  able  to  cope with  the  situation.  The Red Cross  volunteers  of  Curacao could  have 
potentially provided 120 people.50 These people did have to request  leaf from their  employers.  St. 
Eustatius  and Saba were also hit  by Hugo.  Due to the sustained damage,  these  islands  were also 
unreachable by phone. Marines were send over to assist these islands. The number of homeless on the 
SSS-islands was estimated to be around 3000. On St. Eustatius almost all houses were damaged.
Recovery
Dutch marines helped with the recovery activities. 34 marines, supplemented with 10 medical 
personnel, were flown in on Saturday from Curacao.51 In addition, a frigate (the Pieter Floris) of the 
Dutch  Royal  Navy  was  headed  for  the  struck  area.  The  Antillean  prime-minister,  Liberia-Peters, 
requested the above mentioned aid as soon as it became clear that Hugo would hit the Leeward islands. 
The Dutch  navy announced to send in  two more plains  to  St.  Maarten,  which  would be carrying 
additional marines and material. prime-minister of the Netherlands Antilles, Liberia-Peters, visited the 
struck islands. She stated that the Antillean government will do everything that is required to aid these 
islands. Besides the major damage, Hugo did also have a beneficial effect. The harbor of St. Maarten 
had become to shallow by mid 1989, and because of a lack of funds the local authorities were unable to 
dredge the harbor. However, Hugo caused the harbor to be at its original depth again. 
The Antillean government expected aid from the Netherlands, like was provided in the past.52 
Antillean minister Gums told the Dutch government that St. Maarten would put in a formal request for 
financial  aid  with  the  Antillean  government,which  forwarded  this  bill  to  The  Hague.  The  Dutch 
minister for Antillean affairs, minister Jan de Koning declared on September 30, that aid would be 
partially  provided  by  means  of  soft  loans  and  donations.53 Only  for  those  who  had  sustained 
'considerable' damage were deemed eligible for aid. When De Koning was asked where this aid should 
49 Telegraaf, September 18, 1989. 
50 Amigoe di Curacao, September 18, 1989
51 Algemeen Dagblad, September 18, 1989. 
52 NRC, September, 20 1989.
53 Amigoe di Curacao, September 30 1989.
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be coming from he answered: “From the development budget of course.”54 Remarkable is the fact that 
the European Community decided to sent aid of Hfl. 7,5 million to the hurricane struck Caribbean, 
including to St. Maarten.55 The raising of funds by means of charity was again established. In the 
Netherlands a 'telethon' was held on television to raise funds.  The network 'Veronica' had sent film 
crews to the struck islands to record the effects of Hugo.
Inhabitants, businesses and other institutions who had sustained damage by Hugo, were eligible 
to receive aid from the Netherlands. Excluded were those properties that were insured. The damage 
assessment was done by a Dutch damage expert. There were however limits; the lower limit was set on 
750 guilders and the upper limit on 75.000 guilders.56 Properties worth more than Hfl. 750.000 were 
excluded, since these were considered to be insured.57 However, some of these properties were not or 
under  insured.  Other aid from the Dutch and the EEC was the funding of a shipment  of building 
materials worth 440.000 guilders. De Koning also reported that the Netherlands would provide Hfl. 
1.65 million for Saba, St. Eustatius and Bonaire. This money was however part of already promised 
development aid from the Dutch government to the Netherlands Antilles. Even so, the money was 
made available sooner, due to Hugo. 
On Aruba, money was collected for the people of the Leeward islands. Two civil institutions on 
Curacao, the Curaçaose Setel and the Landradio, offered aid to the Leeward islands with material and 
know-how.58 The Kiwanis Club on Curacao had opened a disaster fund to aid the victims of hurricane 
Hugo on the Leeward islands. 
The  Caribbean  Association  of  Telecommunication  companies,  Canto,  stated  that  it  would 
concentrate its recovery activities on areas which 'stand alone' and have no (former) ties with a mother 
country. The Dutch Leeward island would thus receive no aid since they were bound to receive aid 
from the Antillean or Dutch governments.  A number of banks also donated money.  The Maduro and 
Curielsbank (MCB) and the Leeward Islands Bank bank donated Hfl. 60.000. Hfl. 30000 was send to 
St. Maarten en Hfl. 15.000 to Saba and Hfl. 15.000 to St. Eustatius.59
At that time minister De Koning did foresaw constitutional change.60 The Netherlands Antilles 
would remain one entity. However, De Koning had the idea to split the Netherlands Antilles into two: 
one center with St. Maarten as the head of the Leeward islands, and one center being Curacao, with 
Bonaire as its 'subject'. De Koning stated that there first had to be political decisions by the government 
of the Netherlands Antilles before the the country would receive 'technical' support to help with any 
political change. 
During the opening speech of meeting between the Kingdom-partners, the chairwoman of the 
Committee for Dutch, Antillean, and Aruban Affairs, Ms. Haas-Berger, stated the following: 
“I express my sympathies to the victims of Hugo. The hurricane has caused much suffering,  
in  the  personal,  intangible  and  financial  sphere(...).  Natural  disasters  such  as  these  are  
unimaginable in the Netherlands,  there is no such thing like the Delta Plan conceivable to  
avoid  [such]  consequences.  The  willingness  to  accord  each  other  with  aid  applies  –  
particularly – in such circumstances.”61
54 Volkskrant, September 22, 1989. 
55 Amigoe di Curacao, September 20 1989. 
56 Ibidem, October 4, 1989. 
57 Budget of the Dutch parliament (Begroting Staten-Generaal) 1990, 
http://resourcessgd.kb.nl/SGD/19891990/PDF/SGD_19891990_0003888.pdf 
58 Amigoe di Curacao, September, 20 1989.
59 Ibidem, October, 4 1989
60 Volkskrant, September 22, 1989. 
61 Opening Speech 'Parliamentary Contact Plan Netherlands-Netherlands Antilles-Aruba', Meeting September 25, 1989, 
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This quote shows two sides of the Dutch parliament. On the hand there is a willingness to aid the 
stricken Antilles, as is mentioned in the Charter of the Kingdom. On the other hand, a consequent and 
intensive  disaster-management  approach,  similar  to  that  of  the  Dutch  Delta  Plan  was  obviously 
inconceivable.  This  view  can  have  many  reasons.  In  1989  it  had  been  almost  30  years  since  a 
considerable hurricane had struck the Antilles. Therefore, it may have been deemed unnecessary to 
engage in extra disaster-preparedness. Also the nature of the catastrophe,  a hurricane,  was perhaps 
misunderstood. It seems that the view was that a hurricane can be so veracious that its consequences 
can not be avoided. In reality  there were a range of activities  that could have been undertaken to 
improve  the  disaster-preparedness;  one  can  think  of  the  construction  of  underground  power-lines, 
reinforced roofs, adequate building codes, sea walls and an effective disaster-plan. The absence in the 
Dutch parliament of such proposals (an Antillean Delta Plan) presents a relationship that is mainly 
based on ad-hoc decisions when it comes to disaster-management. And an unwillingness to spent such 
an amount of money. Illustrative to this view is the fact that part  of the funding which was made 
available to the struck islands, was in fact money already destined for these parts, only to be made 
available earlier. 
2.2.3 Hurricane Luis, a comparison between Sint Maarten and Saint Martin
In this section I will first review the advent, impact and aftermath  of hurricane Luis on the 
Dutch part of St. Maarten. Thereafter I will review the same hurricane on the French part; Saint Martin. 
Because the troubles with the illegal immigrants influenced the situation and reactions of both parts 
directly, this section will be reviewed at the end of the 'Dutch' review, which will include both parts. 
Thereafter, hurricane Luis will be examined on Saint Martin in the same way as is done with the other 
hurricanes.
Advent and impact
Luis was predicted to hit St. Maarten on the 1st of September 1995.62 Immediately comparisons 
with Hugo were made with regard to the intensity of hurricane Luis in the media.63 The local authorities 
on St. Maarten requested aid from the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. From bases on the 
Windward islands, 56 marines were flown in to help the population of St. Maarten prepare for the 
hurricane.64 Houses were reinforced and all the yachts were brought in the Simpson Bay for protection 
the storm.65 It was estimated that 50 percent of the buildings would sustain  damage.66 Schools were set 
up as emergency hospitals. The population stored large amount of food and water. There were fourteen 
'storm-proof' shelters built on the island.  
On the 5th of September 1995 hurricane Luis hit the island of St. Maarten. It was soon labeled as 
the worst natural disaster ever to have hit the Friendly island.67 Luis struck with incredible force. 80 
percent of the houses were either significantly damaged or totally destroyed. 5 to 7000 people became 
homeless.68 The Juliana-airport  was completely flooded. This prohibited the arrival of aircraft  with 
http://resourcessgd.kb.nl/SGD/19891990/PDF/SGD_19891990_0003450.pdf
62 Rotterdams Dagblad, September 11, 1995. 
63 Telegraaf, September 5, 1995
64 Ibidem, September 9, 1995. 
65 Amigoe di Curacao, September 5, 1995. 
66 Telegraaf, September 9, 1995. 
67 Algemeen Dagblad, September 7, 1995. 
68 Amigoe di Curacao, September 11, 1995.
19
emergency materials and military personnel. The shanty towns, which inhabited thousands of illegal 
immigrants were completely destroyed by Luis. Most of the large hotels were spared any significant 
damage  because  they  were  properly  constructed.  Electricity  and  phone  poles  had  been  destroyed, 
rendering large sections of the island without power, and the communications with the island to be 
broken. All major roads were blocked by debris or trees. In addition, the water facilities were also 
inoperative.  For  days  water  had to  distributed by water  trucks,  or  handed out  with bottles.  In  the 
Simpson Bay most of the 1200 yachts were either sunk or washed upon the shore by huge waves.69 The 
hospital on St. Maarten was rendered useless. Saba and St. Eustatius were also struck by Luis, however 
much less severe than St. Maarten. 
Recovery
 In the wake of the disaster people started looting. Although some supplies, like food and water, 
were in short supply, most people started to loot valuables or even clothing. Some supermarkets made 
their supplies available to the general public. During the first days after the storm the local police force, 
supported by the Dutch marines, had to stop these looters and restore order. Therefore they could not 
start with the recovery process. The local authorities installed a curfew to curb the looting, no one was 
allowed  outside  between  6  pm  and  6  am.70 A state  of  emergency  was  proclaimed  by  the  local 
authorities. The marines also had to guard the dumps.71  again prohibited the from engaging in the 
recovery process.  Consumption of this food could contribute to a potential epidemic, which the local 
authorities  feared.  This  was  mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  sanitation  in  the  slums  near  Philipsburg. 
Venezuela  had  sent  over  disinfection  equipment  to  curb  the  threat  of  an  epidemic.72 Among  the 
wounded some, according to the Dutch the NRC, had shot wounds.73 According to the paper, these were 
caused by Dutch marines who had shot them in an attempt to stop the looting. This was  by the Dutch 
military. Only one aimed shot was confirmed by the Dutch commander of the marines.74
In addition to the already present marines, the Dutch government sen a great number of rescue 
workers and aid material; extra military personnel was flown in, a detachment of Dutch fire-fighter 
were flown in at the request of the ministry of Internal Affairs. A day after the hurricane had struck the 
airport was cleared of debris and reopened. Two Dutch aircraft were flown in which carried 40 tons of 
rescue equipment and around 60 people, including firemen and physicians.75 The Dutch emergency 
personnel was instructed to lead local firemen, since the fire brigade on the island lacked qualified 
staff. In addition an air-bridge was set up between Curacao and St. Maarten. Personnel and material 
were flown in, and wounded were flown out. Altogether around a thousand Dutch aid workers were 
flown or shipped in to support St. Maarten with the reconstruction process. 
Directly after Luis and as soon as it became clear that the damage was significant, the Dutch 
ministry of Defense installed a joint crisis-center, which represented multiple Dutch government 
departments.76 The Dutch Navy was responsible for the aid which was sen over from the Netherlands. 
The overall coordination on St. Maarten was, at least in theory, entrusted with the local authorities. 
Formally, the local gezaghebber, Mr. Richardson, was the head of the aid effort. But in the chaos after 
69 Volkskrant, October, 9, 1995. 
70 NRC, September 11, 1995. 
71 Rotterdam Dagblad, September 11, 1995. 
72 Trouw, September 9, 1995. 
73 NRC, September 11, 1995. 
74 Ibidem, September 12, 1995. 
75 Rotterdams Dagblad, September 6, 1995. 
76 Staatscourant, September 6, 1995. 
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the storm most Dutch aid workers made their own plans. 
The initial recovery process proved indeed to be very chaotic. There was no central 
coordination in Philipsburg to direct the aid effort. On the French side, communication was restored 
within a day. A reporter of the Antillean newspaper, Amigoe di Curacao, asked why immediately after 
the storm the island was completely looted, without a response of the local authorities?77 The 
authorities new that the hurricane was coming, days in advance. The same reporter wrote: “Would it 
not have made more sense if before the disaster a group of people with the necessary skills would have 
been sent to St. Maarten, instead of thereafter?”78
The autonomous status of the Netherlands Antilles within the Kingdom had put the Dutch 
military in a delicate position. They wanted to help, but Gezaghebber Richardson had the ultimate 
authority and last say in many matters. One example is the reopening of the gas stations. After a few 
days Richardson had prioritized repairs for the gas stations.79 When they were opened, the long lines in 
front of the gas stations caused a chaos on the roads. This in turn caused that Dutch rescue workers 
could not do their work fast, which lead to much complaining with the Dutch rescue workers. They 
stated that many disaster tourists from the French visited the struck area, causing additional traffic 
jams. After a few days aid transports were accompanied by police motorists, thus speeding the 
transport of materials and food stuffs and water. Apart from constitutional troubles, there still was the 
colonial past, which hampered a truly friendly relationship between the Netherlands and St. Maarten. 
For example in 1992 St. Maarten was put under legal constraint and the Netherlands effectively took 
over the budget planning of the island.80 The Netherlands were blamed to behave in a colonial way. The 
Dutch stated that the island was a victim of corruption. 
The Dutch government decided to sen in a team of experts to St. Maarten. This team had to 
assess which aid projects the Netherlands could support or engage in. According to Dutch prime-
minister, Mr. Kok, the government decided for a project-based approach, instead of simply transferring 
funds.81 The team should report within a month which problems should be addressed first. The Dutch 
government wanted the tour operators to keep St. Maarten on their destination lists.
The Red Cross in the Netherlands got its information through the Red Cross on Curacao, 
however the connection between St. Maarten and Curacao was very poor. A Dutch Red Cross operative 
had to be sent to St. Maarten with a satellite phone to report on the circumstances.82 The arrival of 
hurricane Marilyn, only ten days after Luis, delayed the recovery process. Thankfully, Marilyn proved 
to be much less severe, although some debris and tents from the camp were blown around and heavy 
rains further damaged the roofless buildings' interiors. 
The Antillean community in the Netherlands opened a bank account. Donations were primarily 
focused on help for the financially disadvantaged and victims of the storm. Ten days after Luis tens of 
thousands of guilders were already donated for the victims of Luis.83 Multiple charity actions were held 
throughout the Netherlands. The Dutch Julian Welfare-Fund donated Hfl. 1 million.84  Rotterdam 
always had held close ties with the Antilles and The Rotterdam city council donated Hfl. 200.000.85 
The foundation 'Aid hurricane victims' collected Hfl. 600.000.86 The money was made available for the 
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families of illegal immigrants. On Curacao a fund raiser was initiated by the local government.87 
Money and goods were collected by the Curacao Red Cross.  Aruba also wanted to aid St. Maarten. 
The prime-minister of Aruba, Henny Eman, declared that the government would put a group of fire-
man and other experts together. They would have to travel to the Leeward islands  and on arrival would 
assess which aid is deemed to be necessary for the recovery.88 On Aruba bank accounts were opened 
for donations for the victims of Luis. 
The Netherlands Antilles donated Hfl. 25 million.89 Minister Voorhoeve realized that this was 
all about the Antillean government could spare, since the they were in dire financial straits. 
Gezaghebber Richardson requested Hfl. 220 million.90 He claimed that he needed these funds for the 
first few weeks of the disaster relief effort to ensure that everyone would be helped adequately. 
Moreover, Richardson was also making plans to save the tourist season. He wanted to restore enough 
hotel rooms to ensure that the tourist would keep on coming on. He was therefore more interested in 
the reconstruction of the hotels instead of the houses or  public buildings. 
As stated, the Dutch government did agree in providing some funds. First Hfl. 10 million was 
granted, later Hfl. 15 million was added. 91 It was estimated than between Hfl. 1 and 2 billion worth of 
damage was caused by Luis.92 The Dutch newspaper the Financieel Dagblad, stated that the damage 
was Hfl. two billion.93 Minister Pronk of development aid and Minister Voorhoeve of Antillean affairs 
declared that they would give substantial aid to the struck island.94 The Hague was however reluctant to 
promise any large amounts of money. Illustrative is the plea of the Nederlandse Participatie 
Maatschappij voor de Nederlandse Antillen (Dutch Participation Company for the Netherlands 
Antilles) for a national plan for the reconstruction of the island.95 For example the already obsolete, and 
recently damaged airport should be reconstructed. A spokesman of the department of Antillean affairs 
replied: “Everybody can see on TV that the damage is huge, however it is to early to assess what the 
Netherlands can do. We must first wait for the plans of the Antillean government. According to us, 
there is no need for a national rescue plan for St. Maarten.”96 The spokesman recognized that the 
hurricane was disastrous for the economy of the Antilles. Mainly because they already had a huge 
deficit. Since tourism brought in hundreds of millions of revenue for the Antillean treasury, the deficit 
was bound to grow after Luis, which had wrecked the tourist infrastructure. The tourist sector earned 
Hfl. 850 million of the total of Hfl. 1 billion of revenue for Dutch St. Maarten.97 It was estimated that 
there would be 15 to 20 percent less revenue from the tourist sector in '95 and '96.98 According to the 
Curacao Bankers Association, the Netherlands Antilles had to conduct major budget cuts. 
According to minister Voorhoeve, the damage caused by Luis was estimated on Hfl. 1 billion.99 
50 percent was damage inflicted to public services and 50 percent was inflicted to private property. The 
damage inflicted to the yachts was not jet included. About Hfl. 300 million was insured by private 
insurance companies. In a similar vein when hurricane Hugo struck in 1989, the minister stated that the 
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civilians should not count on the government to pay for the uninsured damage. Voorhoeve said that the 
aid from the Netherlands  consist of donations, loans, guarantees and he wanted to focus on the most 
important public facilities. A Dutch former major, Roozemond, headed the Committe Reconstruction 
St. Maarten (Commissie Wederopbouw St. Maarten).100 Voorhoeve expected a report by the committee 
in two weeks. This committee had to establish how the money should be spend, so which projects 
should receive aid. The Dutch government intended to keep total control of the aid related 
expenditures, this was deemed to be patronizing according to the Dutch parliament.
St. Maarten also received help from Brussels. Dutch members of the European Parliament 
requested structural support for the victims of Luis on St. Maarten. The European Parliament should 
ask the European Commission to work with the World Bank, the inter-American Development Bank 
and the Netherlands. “Since only a fast and coordinated approach could stop the suffering of the 
population and save the coming tourist season”, according to two Dutch liberal European parliament 
members. St. Maarten received Hfl. 1.2 million from Brussels.101 The money would be made available 
to the Dutch Red Cross and the local authorities. In total, the European Commission spent over Hfl. 2 
million on the Caribbean islands which had been struck by Luis. The UN had also declared to come to 
the aid of St. Maarten. There was $ 80.000 made available for the purchase of materials.102
On the 14th of October the last military personal left St. Maarten. In total 847 soldiers were 
engaged in the recovery activity on the island.103 According to commander Koeman, the operations on 
the Leeward islands were done in record time. The recovery was done in steps. A number of marines 
were present prior to the storm, they helped people prepare for the storm. The second step was the 
assistance of the police. Dutch marines helped to keep order. Buildings had to be protected from looters 
and the curfew had to be enforced. Subsequently, the emergency aid for the inhabitants started, with the 
construction of camps. The military also cleared debris and waste and made additional repairs to public 
buildings. 
During the first six months after Luis the tourist industry was largely restored. Tourists were 
welcome again on November 1, 1995.104 By mid November two American airlines had decided to start 
flying en route to St. Maarten once every week. In addition, cruise ships were also coming in again. 
Although the tourist facilities were restored rapidly, behind the facade, the Friendly island was still a 
big mess. Most public facilities and large numbers of houses were still in disarray. In the class rooms, 
water and food were still handed out by mid November.105 Many people were still living in great 
poverty. A local politician, Vance James, stated: “We have been spoiled, we have not experienced a big 
hurricane in 35 years. We just built lots of buildings without asking ourselves whether the houses 
would be hurricane-proof. It is striking that most older homes have remained in one piece. There has 
been spent much on housing, but only to make them more beautiful and bigger.”106 Not until early 
December, when containers furnished as houses arrived on St. Maarten, could the camp be replaced.107 
The container-camp included sanitation, a restaurant and recreational facilities. It could accommodate 
up to 600 individuals. There were not many people who wanted to live in the containers. For the 
containers people had to pay rent. The containers actually were bedrooms without sanitation. Eating 
cooking, washing and recreation took place in communal areas. Richardson stated after Luis: “We are 
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not going to rebuild St. Maarten, we are going to improve it.”108 The island would be 'a totally new 
island' by 1999. In the future it would be hurricane proof due to rigid building codes. According to 
Elsje Wilson, an employee of a local museum, Luis brought people together: “People sheltered each 
other, spoke to their neighbors. Everyone has experienced the same thing, rich or poor. “How is your 
roof”, was a common phrase (…) it is as if the society has become more open (…) You have the feeling 
you are being governed, politicians make sure that their message comes across.”109
Authority crisis
The hurricane could not have happened on a worse moment with regard to finance. The 
Netherlands Antilles were in a dire financial situation. The Netherlands Antilles treasury had a debt of 
Hfl. 2,3 billion, Aruba had a debt of Hfl. 1,1 billion110 with a combined GDP of Hfl. 6 billion.111 
Curacao had an immediate funding problem. The government of the Netherlands Antilles was already 
planning major budget cuts, and increased taxation. This program started at the same moment when 
Luis struck. Hfl. 600 million of the treasury came from St. Maarten, per annum.112 Since the tourist 
sector of St. Maarten was severely struck, it was assumed that a major budget deficit would arise. 
prime-minister Pourier had a plan to have the entire Netherlands Antilles be declared a disaster area by 
the UN. In doing so the Antilles could claim international support. The Dutch government responded 
by making the reconstruction of St. Maarten  the new aim for the budget of department of Antillean and 
Aruban affairs.113 
The Netherlands would provide the aid for reconstruction in parts and per project to prevent the 
aid from falling in the hands of the mafia. International criminals were, according to Dutch government 
officials, preying on the aid.114 Richardson would also receive more authority. Voorhoeve wanted to 
give more authority to Richardson that he could act fast. This should prevent that the reconstruction of 
the island would become a mess. According to Voorhoeve, in these kinds of situation there is: “usually 
less adequate control”.115 Voorhoeve stated that the Netherlands would provide more money, but first a 
better reconstruction plan had to be made by the authorities of St. Maarten. The money that would be 
donated would be given in parts. 
The Netherlands Antillean parliament wanted to stop the plans of the Dutch government to give 
more authority to Richardson with regard to the reconstruction process. This would effectively stop the 
democratic process on St. Maarten. The Antillean parliament proposed an emergency law to alter the 
Dutch plan.116 Former prime-minister Liberia-Peters called the Dutch approach 'a crisis of trust'.117 
prime-minister Kok of the Netherlands stated during a visit to the Antilles that: “Talking about Dutch 
pressure (when referring to the Dutch plan to grant Richardson more authority)  is an example of a 
debate which has gone wrong. The matter at hand is to help St. Maarten, quickly and effectively and 
that the spending [of aid] should be conducted in an appropriate manner. Everything else is not of 
interest.”118 prime-minister Kok thus countered any criticism with regard to the arisen crisis of 
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authority. Kok deemed it of vital importance to bypass the Netherlands Antilles and the local 
democratic process of St. Maarten to adequately aid the struck island. A majority in the Netherlands 
Antilles' parliament wanted to give Richardson an advantageous position but he should not have all 
control. The Antillean parliament still wanted that he would have to discuss his decisions with the local 
executive council and the local island council, the elected democratic organs. The gezaghebber was not 
elected but appointed by the Crown, just like a Dutch major. Newspapers on Curacao were worried 
about the plan, and even wrote about a return of St. Maarten under Dutch rule with the aid of 
gezaghebber Richardson.119 Another breaking point was the time span of the proposal of the Dutch to 
give more power to Richardson. The Dutch demanded that regulation would remain in effect until April 
1 1996. The Antillean government wanted it to end on December 31 1995.120 The Kingdom cabinet or 
Rijksministerraad (which included the Dutch government and the Antillean ministers plenipotentiary) 
agreed with the temporary emergency law in which additional powers had been granted to the 
gezaghebber, Richardson.121 Furthermore, the Dutch government stipulated that the Dutch financial 
donations for the reconstruction of St. Maarten would not have to be provided to a fund which was set 
up by the Netherlands Antilles.122 This was also the case for international donations. Like those from 
the European Union and the World Bank. Vice prime-minister Dijkstal said that the Netherlands would 
only finance projects that had been selected by a team of experts. Dijkstal: “It is more appropriate if the 
funding is controlled from the Netherlands for the time being.”123 The emergency law would remain 
into effect until January 1, 1996. The normal powers of executive council and the island council would 
not be affected more than is necessary. In effect, the democratic process on St. Maarten now took place 
after decisions had been made, instead of prior to any decisions or proposals had been made. This 
limited the democratic process on the island. Under the emergency law the governor of the Netherlands 
Antilles would have a supervisory role. If the span of the emergency law would be deemed to be to 
short, it could have been extended until April 1, 1996. The emergency law was annulled on January 1, 
1996.124 In addition, the supervision on St. Maarten's budget would be canceled at the end of January 
1996. Voorhoeve stated that the supervision caused to many problems. The island needed constant 
permission from the the government in Willemstad. Now the island could regain its trust.
Another issue was with The Dutch National Bank (DNB), which provided a loan of over Hfl. 
200 million.125 This loan should be used to pay a part of the debt of the Netherlands Antilles. The loan 
was part of an aid program of the IMF for the Netherlands Antilles. Since the country was not a 
member of the IMF, the loan had to be provided through the Netherlands. The economic situation on 
the Antilles was according to the IMF 'very serious'.126 There was a growing budget deficit, growing 
public debt and a the foreign exchange reserves were also dropping. A part of the Kingdom had to 
subject itself to an IMF program for the first time in 50 years. The Dutch parliament supported the IMF. 
A spokesman of the CDA, Mulder- van Dam stated: “Interposition by a third party is necessary, since 
harsh measures by our (Dutch) government could be looked upon as an unwanted way of 
interference.”127 The Dutch Bank would borrow money on the terms of the IMF. The IMF would 
supervise the projects, if a project was deemed successful by the IMF, more money would be lend to 
the Netherlands Antilles. The country had to repay the loan within three to five years. 
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Illegal immigrants 
Although Luis was indiscriminate with regard to social status, the shanty towns, which were 
populated by illegal immigrants from mainly Haiti and the Dominican Republic and whom constituted 
a cheap labor reservoir, were totally destroyed by Luis. The small shacks could not withstand the 
onslaught of the storm and virtually all illegal immigrants became homeless. Different sources state 
different numbers of illegal immigrants It was estimated by the Dutch newspaper NRC, that between 15 
and 30 thousand, or more, illegal immigrants inhabited the island.128 However the Dutch minister of 
Antillean affairs, Voorhoeve confirmed that around 12.000 illegal immigrants were present on the 
island.129 This was the same number as the Antillean government confirmed.130 It is remarkable and 
striking that the local gezaghebber of St. Maarten, Dennis Richardson, estimated the number to be 
closer to five thousand  individuals.131 Because these people were not registered, most of them were 
afraid to request or even receive aid, since they feared registration and subsequent deportation by the 
local authorities. Because the illegal immigrants were not registered and they avoided contact with any 
rescue personal, many people thought that many of them had died during the storm. A rumor which 
proved to be very persistent. The Dutch looked for bodies with dogs, but none were found.132
Richardson, wanted to finish what Luis had started and made plans to clear the slums. He 
already had made plans prior to the storm. In the week after the storm a camp was built for the 
inhabitants of the slums. People were encouraged to take up residence in the camps. However, as 
stated, most of them feared registration and eviction. Therefore only around 300 people actually 
inhabited the camp.133 It could accommodate up to 1200 people. Overall, half of the camp was 
inhabited. Another reason why only 300 people inhabited the camp was that there were no prospects 
with regard to any new housing programs, a stay in the camps was still indefinite, but could also been 
seen as an improvement. Most of the slums lacked any sanitation. At least in the camp there was 
adequate sanitation and drinking water available. 
On the 12th of September a local newspaper on St. Maarten, the Guardian, claimed that Dutch 
marines were going to demolish the shanty towns.134 According to the commander of the Dutch 
military, Dutch soldiers were not allowed to do this. This was supported by the prime-minister of the 
Netherlands, Mr. Kok, who said that the marines would not assist in any deportations.135 Mr. Kok said 
in the Dutch parliament: “The assistance is explicitly not used for the forced eviction of inhabitants of 
the slums or forced removal of illegal aliens.”136 The marines would only assist in keeping order on the 
island. The slums had to be demolished by the police of St. Maarten. prime-minister Pourier of the 
Netherlands Antilles, stated that he was not planning to deport the illegal immigrants. This statement 
took away the fear from the Dutch soldiers that they might had to evacuate and demolish the slums. 
Pourier recognized that these illegal immigrants, which he estimated to be around 10 to 20 thousand, 
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were needed for the economy of St. Maarten.137 He wanted to grant these illegal immigrants some kind 
of legal status, but he was uncertain about what kind of status these immigrants should receive. Pourier 
had stated in the Antillean parliament that deportation of the illegal immigrants was not consistent with 
the principle of good governance, with the human rights and the ambition of the Antilles to further 
integrate themselves in to the Caribbean. However, the Antillean government and the local government 
of St. Maarten were afraid that the shanty towns would be rebuild. Pourier stated that these slums were 
a thing of the past.
Richardson also stated that the illegal immigrants would not be deported and that the aid effort 
was focused on all inhabitants of island, legal or illegal.138 People who wanted to leave to their country 
of origin, and did not have enough money for a flight, were offered the possibility to leave the island 
with a flight provided by the local government. 1500 illegal immigrants made use of this offer, and left 
for their place of origin.139 Their homes were destroyed and there probably would not be any work in 
the tourist sector any time soon. Richardson had already made plans in June of 1995 to demolish the 
shanty towns.140 But, because of Luis, Richardson wanted to hurry his plans. In the mean time he 
wanted to house the population of the slums in the camps. Thereafter adequate housing should be 
constructed for the. In due time illegal immigrants should be integrated into the society with a legal 
status, which would grant them at least working permits. About, three to four thousand could receive a 
work permit.141 As stated, Richardson estimated the number of illegal immigrants to be around five 
thousand. One of the reasons a lot of these illegal immigrants still had no residence permits, according 
to Richardson, was because the local authorities could not handle all the requests.142 Although 
Richardson had mentioned that no one should be deported, he broke his promise. By early October the 
police started to evict illegal immigrants. Only people who could not demonstrate that they had been on 
St. Maarten prior to the storm, or had requested a housing permit were evicted.143
Members of European Parliament heard about the possible deportations from St. Maarten, they 
called for humane shelters for the illegal immigrants.144 The storm should not be used as an excuse to 
evacuate these people. In the Netherlands, prime-minister Kok said that deportation of the illegal 
immigrants was .145 But the Dutch could not stop any deportation, since the Netherlands Antilles had an 
autonomous status within the Kingdom. 
There were plans for improved housing for the slum dwellers. The island' local government had 
hired an engineering company by mid September to make plans for a new and permanent residential 
area, which would house the inhabitants of the camps.146 The costs for this enterprise would be payed 
by the donations which were given by the Dutch and Antillean governments. But the local government 
had not received more than Hfl. 35 million, and this was hardly enough to reconstruct the island. The 
minister of Antillean affairs, Joris Voorhoeve was very critical about the plan to bulldoze the shanty 
towns. He stated that the reconstruction process should be prioritized.147 The minister made agreements 
with the local authorities concerning the illegal immigrants. They should be able to register themselves 
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and than they would be able to build dwellings on small plots.148 These plots would be connected to 
water, electricity and sewage. However, these plots were not yet available when Richardson wanted to 
start the demolition of the shanty towns. Richardson wanted to continue his plan and was bound to start 
with the forceful evacuation of the slums. However, a spokesman kept delaying the evacuation of the 
slums. He stated that the evacuation would start on Wednesday, but earlier he was just as firm about 
Monday and Tuesday.149 In the end a local civil servant stated that about a third of the slums would not 
be demolished.150 It appears that Richardson was trying to put pressure on the illegal immigrants by 
threatening to demolish their former living areas to force them into the camps, as is shown, without 
much result. It did lead to other complications. For instance, the idea appeared that the Dutch marines 
had to assist in the evacuation and subsequent destruction of the slums. However the Dutch were not 
planning to participate in the evacuation.
Two months after Luis 'Tent City', the camp which was constructed bu the Dutch military, had 
become very crowded. Illegal immigrants came to the camp when they heard that if would be 
registered, they could probably stay. Whoever remained unregistered could be arrested and deported 
out of St. Maarten.151 Antilleans, who were not welcome anymore with their families or friends, 
inhabited Tent City too. Conditions were far from ideal. The camp was full and people had to wait until 
another camp was finished and for the arrival of 1200 emergency-homes, which were ordered in the 
Netherlands and the United States. As mentioned above, some containers, furnished as 'houses' arrived 
on St. Maarten in the first week of December. 
French reaction concerning illegal immigrants
The French proved to be far more rigid and strict in their treatment of the illegal immigrants. 
The authorities on the French part of Saint Martin urged any illegal immigrants, mainly Haitians, to 
register themselves. It was estimated that around 7000 illegal immigrants inhabited French St. 
Maarten.152 They had to report themselves in camps, subsequently they would be flown back to their 
mother countries at the expense of the government. If they failed to do so they would be removed out 
of the country. The French, like their 'Dutch' counterparts, wanted to rid themselves of the shanty 
towns. Gendarmes had guarded the border with Dutch St. Maarten to prevent any Haitians or 
Dominicans access to the French part. The French were afraid of a 'Dutch' exodus, since Richardson 
had announced first to bulldoze the slums. Only a few illegal immigrants decided to report themselves 
at the camps on both sides of the islands. No one really felt like leaving their slum and lie 'indefinitely' 
in a muddy camp. As mentioned above, not until early December, when containers furnished as houses 
arrived on St. Maarten, could the camp be replaced.153 The container-camp could accommodate up to 
600 individuals.
There was much comment on the assistance after Luis. The population was displeased about the 
fact that the assistance on the French part of Saint Martin was done much faster and more adequately. 
The French government had sent a military disaster team to Saint Martin, which started to clear the 
roads and repair the houses immediately. However, Marigot was significantly less damaged than 
Philipsburg. Most remained in tact and those who did not, sustained minor damage.154 There seemed to 
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be hardly any damage to buildings, due to strict building codes on the French part, which the Dutch 
part lacked. According to the Dutch Naval commander, J.W de Jager, the damage which was inflicted 
by Luis on the French part of the island was much less severe.155 In contrast with the Dutch part, the 
communication and infrastructure largely remained undamaged. Therefore, according to De Jager, the 
local population could be aided immediately. However, the infrastructure was much better prior to the 
storm on the French part. According to many people on both sides of the island, the French authorities 
were better prepared for the hurricane than the Dutch. A Dutch fire-man rejected this: “The French 
more or less declared martial law and have stationed 3000 soldiers, but even 5000 French soldiers 
could not have solved it here on the Dutch side.”156 However, besides Marigot, the French part also 
looked desolate, and many trees had been uprooted. The Bidonville on the French part was also washed 
away and would not be rebuild. The French forbade any reconstruction activities in the Bidonville. 
Saint Martin and Luis
As already mentioned, hurricanes do not care for political borders. Luis made no exception to 
this rule. The hurricane also struck St. Martin with extreme force. First the constitutional status of Saint 
Martin will be reviewed. Thereafter hurricane Luis will be researched.
Constitutional status
 
The French decided to incorporate their French dependencies in the Caribbean into the French 
state. This procedure was called départementalisation and was initiated in 1946. In effect the French 
Caribbean became an integral part of the French republic, by creating the départements d'outre-mer 
(DOM), which were on equal constitutional footing with their counterparts in the mainland. Its people 
became French citizens, with the right to vote in the presidential elections. In short, French colonial 
thinking followed the premise that as the Republic was a single unit, the territories forming integral 
parts should be assimilated thus establishing legal equality with the Republic.157 Saint Martin was part 
of the DOM Guadeloupe in 1946. In 2003 the populations of St. Martin and St. Barthélemy voted in 
favor  of secession from Guadeloupe in order to form separate overseas collectivities of France. This 
new status took effect in 2007.
Hurricane Luis
Advent
Luis hit St. Martin on the fifth of September 1995. In response to the advent of the hurricane, 
the metropolis sent a detachment of 230 men of the Sécurité civile with 20 tons of equipment.158 They 
were positioned in Martinique, but would be sent over to St. Martin as soon as the storm had passed 
and the airport would be re-opened.
Impact
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At least a thousand people became homeless. Moreover, one death and one missing person were 
reported the day after the hurricane. The island became completely unrecognizable, most homes had 
lost their roofs due to the excessive storm. Cargo ships lay on dry land, the Haitian neighborhoods were 
completely destroyed, the marina no longer existed and major hotels were severely damaged. All the 
boats were either sunk or washed upon the shore. The roads were impassable due to fallen trees and 
debris. Even new buildings lost their roofs according to the major of St. Martin, Albert Fleming.159 He 
stated  that: “There is huge damage,”  but he appreciated that, “through information and security 
measures”, there have been no serious injuries.160 The desalination plant was out of order for a few 
days. As a result the island was without water and electricity. According to Mr Fleming, the first 
priority was to repair the roofs and to relocate and feed the 5000 Haitians who lived in barracks prior to 
the hurricane and to provide them with better housing. He was also concerned with the thousands of 
homeless people. Fleming stated: “I will house them and feed them.”161 The French Navy would also 
send assistance to St. Martin. 
During the following days it became clear that on St. Martin at least 8 lives had been lost due to 
Luis. Two thousand people became homeless. 90 percent of the buildings in Marigot, the capital of the 
French part of St. Martin, were damaged. 
Recovery
The French Ministry of Housing announced that it would provide emergency aid with a worth 
of FF 25 million (which is $ 4,8 million) to meet the primary needs of shelter.162 After a trip by the 
Minister of overseas affairs, Jean-Jacqies de Peretti, to the struck islands, he subsequently declared a 
state of emergency for the Caribbean islands of St. Martin and St. Barthélemy (which was also struck, 
however much less severe).
In the Dutch press, the French authorities’  dealing with the hurricane were  often used as a 
mirror for the Dutch. It was described as faster, more efficient and more sizable. In a number of ways, 
this might have been true: the number of marines and when they were employed (before the disaster) or 
the size of the relief funds. However, there were also instances where the discourse made less sense. 
For example with regard to the air traffic. One Dutch tourist, Mrs. Mulder, said that: “France and Air 
France have done everything to help their compatriots. The Netherlands and the KLM did nothing.”163 
An airport operative supported this notion. He was amazed by the fact that the Dutch aircraft waited 
waited so long to land on the island, while French aircraft were already coming in to evacuate stranded 
tourists and inhabitants.164 A dutch tourist stated that French and Columbian planes came in, everybody 
flew except for the KLM”165 A spokesman understood that the reactions of the tourists, but assumed 
that the air controllers of the Juliana airport were simply following the list of the chartered flights.   
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3 The comparative approach: hurricane Hugo in the Lesser 
Antilles
3.1 Montserrat
In this chapter I will examine the impact of hurricane Hugo on Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis. 
The aim is to put the experiences of Saint Martin in a broader scope. This broader scope can 
subsequently be used to compare the different islands (or island-parts) with regard to their ability to 
cope with hurricanes. First Montserrat will be examined, thereafter St. Kitts-Nevis will be researched. 
Like in the previous chapters, I will begin by describing the constitutional status of the island. Next, a 
number of hurricanes will be reviewed according to the same method which has been used in the 
previous chapter. 
3.1.1 Constitutional status
    
The West-Indies were once dubbed the 'darlings of empire'. However, as the twentieth century 
progressed they became the sole remnants of the United Kingdom's formerly vast empire. After the 
Second World War, the British wanted to create a West Indian Federation which would include all 
British territories in the Caribbean. The British deemed bureaucratic centralization necessary for these 
territories,  which  in  their  view  were  unable  to  fulfill  the  obligations  assumed  by  membership  of 
international organizations; they were deemed unable to uphold a reasonable degree of self-government 
on their own; and unable to promote lasting political and economic progress if they were to remain 
separated  and  failed  to  deal  with  their  problems  in  a  larger  context.166 Until  the  creation  of  this 
federation in 1958, Montserrat was part of the Leeward Island Federation. Montserrat joined the short 
lived West Indian Federation, which fell apart in 1962. This federation may have been logical at the 
time, but its failure was sealed in the same regional fragmentation and lack of homogeneity which 
originally  inspired  these  federal  constructions.167 The  islands  were  competitive  rather  than 
complementary.  In addition,  the larger  and wealthier  islands  did not want  to  take up the financial 
burden of the weaker islands, the latter did not want to be dominated by the larger ones. After four 
territories gained independence, the West Indian federation became the Eastern Caribbean Federation, 
but faced the same obstacles and was abandoned in 1965.168
After the disbanding of the West Indian Federation, each remaining Dependent Territory gained 
its  own constitutional system, in contrast  with the United Kingdom, most of these territories have 
written constitutions. In these territories, the Crown held broad legislative powers, in all areas deemed 
necessary for good governance.169 As a result,  the remaining British dependencies in the Caribbean 
have  varying degrees  of  political  dependency.  Some,  like Bermuda,  are  almost  'independent'.  This 
island is one step away of being independent.  In contrast,  the Cayman Islands is of the Caribbean 
territories the most dependent. 
In the later part of the 1960s, the United Kingdom granted the new status of 'Associated State' to 
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its remaining dependencies in the Caribbean. Under the form of association these territories were to be 
independent in all their domestic affairs, while the United Kingdom would assume responsibility for 
their defence and external relations.170 By the end of the 1960s, British responsibility in the Caribbean 
thus extended to seven Associated States and six Dependent Territories. The latter, like Montserrat, 
preferred  to  remain  dependent  since  they  considered  themselves  too  small  and  too  poor  to  move 
towards Associated Statehood. 
During the  1970s the British tried to rid themselves of their former colonies, only to make a 
complete U-turn in 1984 when the original position was retaken with the government declaring that it  
would  not  force  independence  upon  its  remaining  territories.171 During  the  1990s  this  view  was 
continued, and during the closing years of the decade there was a fresh impetus to modernize the 
existing ties. The territories were dubbed Overseas Territories (OTs) in 1999. In return for Britain's 
willingness to respect the wish of the islands to continue under British sovereignty, the OTs had to 
adhere to certain obligations, which included the observance of human rights, law and order and good 
governance.172 
It is remarkable that – unlike the other metropoles in the region – the United Kingdom never 
supported its decolonization policies through economic aid.173 This is a major difference with the Dutch 
approach,  where  development  aid  was  given with  the  aim to prepare  the  Netherlands Antilles  for 
independence.  Also,  Suriname  was  given  a  voluminous  dowry  when  they  parted  with  the  Dutch 
Kingdom. These financial 'bonuses' were never granted to former British colonies, at the moment of 
their independence. Furthermore, there is a major difference between the French and British concerning 
decolonization. France argued that the DOMs were necessary to national security and status in world 
affairs and they provided advantages to the nation.174 The British lacked such conviction and/or rhetoric 
completely. In other words, where the British seemed reluctant to retain some of their territories, the 
French seemed reluctant to grant them independence. 
3.1.2 Hurricane Hugo
Predisaster situation
Prior to Hugo about 12 thousand people inhabited the small island of Montserrat. The economy 
was primarily dependent on tourism, and to a lesser extant on agriculture. In Plymouth there was a 
small  seaport  and a  small  airport.  The capacity  before  Hugo for  promoting hazard awareness  and 
mitigation and the resources for disaster recovery could be classified as meager.  Like many small 
islands in the region, there were not much resources that could be used for recovery on the island itself. 
Montserrat did have a disaster plan which was completed by the local government in 1987. It specified 
planning responsibilities and to a lesser extent the response activities of governmental organizations. 
However the plan did not indicate the roles and responsibilities of government organizations for the 
disaster  recovery  period.175 Similarly,  the  responsibilities  of  various  NGOs  and  other  service 
organizations  were  only  specified  for  the  emergency  period  but  not  for  recovery.  Concerning 
construction,  the  Caribbean Uniform Building  Code  was  in  place,  but  Montserrat’s  chief  building 
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inspector indicated during an interview that the natural hazards provisions in the code were almost 
nonexistent.176 He added that even the limited provisions were rarely followed due to a shortage of 
trained  building  staff.  In  addition,  land  use  control,  which  would  direct  construction  away  from 
hazardous  areas  had  not  been  adopted  by  the  Montserrat  government.  In  addition,  government 
personnel, who were assigned to carry out disaster recovery programs were not trained before Hugo 
and  were  inadequate  in  terms  of  numbers.177 The  unpreparedness  of  Montserrat  can  partially  be 
explained by the fact that it had been more than sixty years since a hurricane had struck. One inhabitant 
noted: “there was no sensitivity or realism of the nature of the problem before Hugo. Because a lack of  
experience, we were not able to convince people of what they should do.”178 
Impact
Hugo  struck  on  September  17,  1989.  The  tiny  British  dependency  was  devastated  by  the 
hurricane.  A journalist  on  the  island  reported  that  six  people  were  dead,  five  missing  and  local 
authorities stated that almost the entire population of 12 thousand had become homeless due to the 
storm.179 An American disaster assistance adviser, after flying over Montserrat after Hugo, stated:“I 
don't recall seeing a single building still standing (...) I've been doing hurricane relief work for 28 years 
and this is as bad as any I've seen.” The hospital, police stations, schools, churches, hotels and villa  
properties  had  been  wrecked.  Thousands  of  trees  were  destroyed  and  debris  covered  the  roads, 
rendering them impassable. Utility poles were slammed to the ground throughout the island. The dock 
and port facilities were lost due to the storm. Almost all public buildings suffered damage. The tourist 
industry lost 80 percent of its hotel rooms. In addition, the island was without power, telephones, radio 
or fresh water, and had only 24 hours of food left. There were also some reports of looting among the 
chaos.
 An early reconnaissance trip by a helicopter from a British warship, HMS Alacrity, which was 
assisting in the area at the request of the United Nations, revealed that 80 percent of the buildings had 
been damaged,  according to  Commander  Colin Ferbrache.180 Later  reports  estimated 98 percent  of 
homes affected of which 50 percent suffered severe damage and 20 percent were totally destroyed.181 
Reports also confirmed that eleven people died during the impact of Hugo, most of the victims were 
elderly  residents.  The  number  of  casualties,  however,  was  remarkably  small,  compared  to  the 
catastrophic damage to property. In addition, Hugo was a vicious but relatively dry storm. Therefore, 
low-lying areas were spared from flooding and no bridges were lost. 
Short- and long-term relief effort.
A landing party from the British ship Alacrity delivered basic medical supplies as soon as the 
storm subsided and helped to clear the rubble from the runway so that relief aircrafts could get in. The 
island made a desperate appeal for food, drinking water, tents and medicine. Already on the 19 th did the 
British government offer £. one million in emergency aid to islands devastated by the hurricane (Hugo 
had hit multiple British territories).182 A British airlift started to take supplies to the Caribbean and to 
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bring out hundreds of stranded tourists. The delivery included  thirty-seven tons of cargo, including 
water purification tablets, blankets, tents and food, which were loaded on to a Red Cross flight from 
Stansted airport, headed for Montserrat via Antigua.183
Debris had be to removed, however, there were not enough dump sites. Debris was dumped into 
gullies, even before the storm, this resulted in the lowering of the capacity of these gullies to allow 
storm water to runoff. Within a week the main roads were passable again. Since the dock was 
completely destroyed, all emergency supplies had to brought in by plane. Only after a delay of about 20 
days, there arrived a make-shift dock, consisting of a flat-bottom barge with a mounted crane. The lack 
of docking facilities resulted in major difficulties  considering  the  distribution; some aid was not 
unloaded and these ships had to leave and come back later. This resulted in a severe shortage of 
building materials for about seven months after the disaster.184 Some ships carried perishable items 
which rotted away in the ships.  In some areas, water was rationed and was available for only two or 
three hours a day. The restoration of electrical power took five months; it took until February 1990 to 
connect the last areas of the island to the grid again. The phone services were not restored until July 
1990, ten months after Hugo.185 
After three weeks, the government started its house to house damage assessment. By about two 
months after Hugo, all major recovery aid donor organizations started their own, separate damage 
assessments. A lot of  homes were thus surveyed several times, causing much frustration with the 
residents and fueling rumors that aid materials were  sold back on the black market by corrupt 
government officials. One of the reasons the restoration of damaged houses took a long time was the 
uncoordinated damage assessments combined with the fact that government assessments were not 
available for eleven months, thus many households did not receive aid for months. Another cause was 
the sheer scale of destruction. In a short time it became apparent that 100 percent of government 
buildings had received damage, except for the police station. Skilled labor and building materials were 
in short supply, and these were often siphoned off to rebuild the second homes of wealthy foreigners.186 
In July 1990, ten months after Hugo the government officials stated that many public facilities, like 
schools, had not yet been restored. In addition, about 90 percent of upper-class homes were rebuilt, but, 
in contrast, more than 40 percent of low income households (about nine hundred households) had not 
received recovery assistance.187 In addition, most upper-income households, or those with relatives or 
friends overseas who sent them money, bought all the available materials. This fact, combined with the 
minimal docking facilities during the first weeks after Hugo, caused increasing prices for labor and 
materials to three or four times predisaster levels.188 These facts caused slow recovery for low-income 
households. Eight months after Hugo struck a collaborative housing program, involving various NGOs, 
began. In many instances, damaged structures could have been reconstructed to be safer from future 
storms, but a “just put it back”-approach dominated. This program ensured in delivering housing aid 
and in strengthening the organizational capacity of villages to undertake development work beyond the 
recovery process. 
The effectiveness of the National Disaster plan was low. The plan focused primarily on the 
predisaster period, and gave minimal attention to recovery and the immediate post hurricane emergency 
period. According to one observant there was effectively no plan for after the storm, so that everything 
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that was done after the hurricane struck, was an organizational nightmare.189 The plans of government 
agencies and ministries tended to have similar defects; one example is the clearing of the debris. 
Although immediately after the storm, most main roads and the airport were cleared and operational, 
the long-term debris removal and disposal was slow. This was mainly due to a lack of dump sites. The 
government also failed in coordinating the numerous governmental and non-governmental 
organizations which were involved in disaster recovery. For instance, the national disaster coordinator 
failed to have a visible leading role during recovery. This was caused by a lack of the annual budget for 
disaster planning, which only consisted US$ 1,825 per annum.190 
The bad state of disaster-planning can for a large part be contributed to a general absence of 
disasters on the island prior to Hugo. For over sixty years no serious hazard or disaster had occurred on 
the island. Resulting in a lack of disaster planning, mitigation or awareness among the population. 
NGO activity was not incorporated into any disaster plan, thus their activities were mainly on 
an ad hoc basis. They mainly contributed in housing(recovery) projects. Prior to the storm a national 
building code was in place, however, it lacked storm mitigation standards. After Hugo several housing 
reconstruction workshops were held by NGOs to inform the public about mitigation and repair 
techniques.191 In addition, the US peace corps build prefabricated houses after the storm. The Corps 
had, however, hardly any contact or feedback from the disaster-stricken people. Thus, these houses 
were considered unsatisfactory by most residents. 
There were many difficulties between the government and the NGOs. Since neither had made 
plans before the storm is was unclear to all parties who led the recovery and who should engage in the 
different recovery activities, which were required after Hugo had struck. There was no overarching 
coordinating committee to oversee the housing recovery programs. The NGOs felt that the government 
did not possess the experience in disaster recovery needed to lead the recovery effort. One foreign 
NGO director even revealed that he had passed over offers of the government to collaborate.192 The 
NGOs did not want to risk working with the inexperienced government, because of the large number of 
people in need of aid. 
The Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention project was instrumental in raising 
awareness about hurricane disasters, before Hugo. The governor provided leadership in identifying and 
coordinating the roles of various government agencies. He had acquired disaster experience as a public 
servant in the South pacific. According to one governmental official the governor actually ran the 
country for a month after the storm. The governor also established the Development Unit, which was 
the leading authority in coordinating the acquisition of international aid.193 It established a useful 
network for acquiring, disaster recovery funds, materials and personnel. 
Other improvements included the refurbishment or replacement of schools and aboveground 
electricity utility lines were replaced with lower-maintenance and more storm-resistant underground 
lines. But in general, the disaster was not viewed an an opportunity to reduce the future vulnerability of 
Montserrat to coastal storms.194 Concerning long range recovery after Hugo, most notably the national 
disaster coordinator held a series of regular workshops to review and evaluate disaster recovery. The 
disaster plan was also revised and the plan has been updated. However, the government only made a 
marginal increase in the budget for disaster planning. Post Hugo disaster planning was waning as the 
Hugo experience faded into the past. In addition, disaster planning kept a focus on emergency 
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preparedness instead of disaster recovery. Montserrat which was once called 'the Emerald Island of the 
Caribbean', was now severely scarred by Hugo.
3.2 Saint Kitts and Nevis
3.2.1 Constitutional status
 After a troublesome start in 1967 as a tripartite Associated State with Anguilla, St. Kitts-Nevis 
gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1983. In 1980, Anguilla seceded from St. Kitts-
Nevis, to become a British Dependent Territory. St. Kitts-Nevis comprise a loosely knit federation. The 
parliament is located in the capital city of Basseterre in St. Kitts. Nevisians refer to Charlestown as the 
capital of Nevis. St Kitts and Nevis operate with considerable independence, as each island has its own 
executive and administrative branches.195 St Kitts has a prime-minister and Nevis has a premier. Each 
head of state  serves with a cabinet of ministers and associated ministries.  In 1990 St.  Kitts  had a 
population of 36.000 and Nevis of 9000.196 
The islands were struck by severe hurricanes, in the post-war era, 1989 (Hugo), 1995 (Luis), 
1998 (Georges) and 1999 (Jose). If we again use EM-DAT to inventory these hurricanes we get the 
following results:
       
Table 5.1 Damage caused by hurricanes on St. Kitts-Nevis according to EM-DAT197
Total affected is the sum of people who required immediate assistance during a disaster, like people 
who were injured, displaced or became homeless.
3.2.2 Hurricane Hugo
Prestorm conditions
The St. Kitts and Nevis national Disaster Preparedness and prevention Committee was the lead 
disaster planning organization in the Federation of St. Kitts-Nevis in 1989.198 The primary 
responsibilities of the Committee were to carry out the St. Kitts and Nevis National Disaster Plan and 
to mobilize and coordinate domestic and international disaster response actions. The committee 
however, provided only limited coordination between St. Kitts and Nevis; the latter had its own disaster 
plan and a separate organizational arrangement for carrying it out. The year before Hugo, the St. Kitts 
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1989 (Hugo) 46000 1300 1 1300
1995 (Luis) 197000 1800 0 0
1998 (Georges) 400000 10000 5 0
1999 (Jose) 41400 1180 0 100
Total 684400 14280 6 1400
Damage US $ (,000) Total affected Deaths Homeless
Disaster Planning Committee did carry out a national disaster awareness campaign. Nevis did not have 
any such predisaster planning efforts. Considering the fact that St. Kitts and Nevis had not experienced 
any major hurricane since 1928, there was a general lack of preparedness, since people found it hard to 
imagine that such a catastrophe would come about. Similar to Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis had 
limited controls over construction. There was a building code in place, but enforcement tended to be 
lax. Before hurricane Hugo, the capacity for undertaking disaster planning and mitigation was limited 
on St. Kitts and almost nonexistent on Nevis.199
Impact of Hugo
Hugo hit St Kitts-Nevis in the early morning of September 17, 1989, the first direct hit in sixty-
one years. Although no loss of life was reported, the hurricane did damage houses, infrastructure, 
agriculture and tourism, with $US 46 million in damage and left 1300 people homeless. While 
Montserrat was the most severely damaged island in the Caribbean, Nevis and St Kitts were second and 
third.200 On Nevis 65 percent of the houses were damaged.201 A remarkable fact was that many 
traditional houses had withstood the storm, while some modern buildings were severely damaged. 
Crops on both islands sustained major damage. On St. Kitts, an estimated 12 percent of all homes were 
destroyed, with an additional 25 percent sustaining damage. The forests were also severely hit, causing 
extensive soil erosion, which affected the drinking water. Public buildings received a severe pounding. 
The main pier of Basseterre on St. Kitts was damaged, and the only pier on Nevis was damaged but 
remained in working condition. Severe beach erosion and damage to shoreline roadways was extensive 
on both islands. About 20 percent of all public buildings on the islands sustained structural damage.202 
The electricity, phone and water facilities were severely damaged. In addition, most hotels suffered 
substantial damage and were closed to guests for weeks. In response, crew members from the British 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary Brambleleaf provided emergency water and medical supplies.203 
On Nevis, neither the disaster coordinator nor the premier of Nevis made any official 
declaration of an emergency when Hugo approached. There also was a lack of other local-level 
warning systems, like sirens or the ringing of bells. In fact, no organizational structure was in place to 
disseminate timely warnings efficiently nor to respond effectively to the threat posed by Hugo.204 These 
factors may explain why many residents did not take the hurricane warning seriously and why over one 
third of the population did not take any preparedness measures to reduce damage. Yet some residents 
indicated they were aware of possible preparedness measures prior to the onset of the storm. 205 
Immediate relief effort
During the two week period after Hugo, debris from all  major roadways was cleared, the 
homeless were temporarily sheltered and immediate food, medical, and water needs were met. Aerial 
damage assessments were made in days. The seaports and airports on both islands sustained only minor 
damage and were quickly restored in working order. Electricity was restored in two capitals within the 
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two week period. 
Serious damage assessment was quickly underway. On St. Kitts, however, different assessment 
teams were unaware of each other’s efforts, resulting in incomplete data which was difficult to 
compare. On Nevis, assessment teams were poorly staffed, and there was virtually no coordination 
among them.206 The duration of immediate disaster relief was minimized on St. Kitts due to an effective 
Emergency Operations Center staff. Its efforts resulted in a well-organized working relationship 
between NGOs and government organizations in acquiring and distributing aid for rebuilding the 
damaged areas. On Nevis the immediate disaster relief effort took longer. This was due to fact that 
Nevis was more severely hit, thus in need of more materials and aid. Other factors included the lack of 
an operational Emergency Center or a workable disaster plan, which led to delay and poor coordination 
between NGOs and government organizations.207 
Medium term recovery
The government of St. Kitts initiated a plan with the help from the UN to start reforestation, to 
counter soil erosion. Additionally, parliament increased the annual national disaster planning budget by 
tenfold, from $US 1,825 before Hugo to $US 18,250, in order to employ a full time disaster 
coordinator and to provide more support for disaster planning.208 The rebuilding of major public 
structures and hotels incorporated structural strengthening measures. Concerning the disaster plans, the 
St. Kitts plan was prepared by private a consultant five months before Hugo, so there was minimal 
participation in plan preparation by individuals whose organizations would be involved in plan 
implementation. A St. Kittian official stated: “I was under the impression that the plan was only being 
prepared to satisfy some administrative rule of law, which requires that a plan be prepared. There was a 
plan all right, but one that could not be implemented.”209 The Nevis' plan was less confusing to read 
than the St. Kitts plan, however the Nevis plan was prepared by an outside consultant in 1985 with no 
involvement from Nevis officials. In fact, none of the four individuals who were members of the Nevis 
Emergency Organization had participated in plan operation.210 Nor had they ever seen the plan. Also, 
the plan was not updated. 
Damage assessment on Nevis was done on a totally ad hoc basis. At first there was even 
indecision whether the Nevis government should be involved in damage assessment, since people 
mostly relied on their kin and neighbors for help. There was also a sentiment that help would come 
from St. Kitts, since they had the facilities for receiving aid. In the end, the government rounded up 
whoever they could get to put the damage numbers down on paper, the government needed the 
numbers to get international assistance.211 
While a number of NGOs were successful on St. Kitts, both in collaboration with government 
institutions and actual disaster relief, on Nevis most of the NGOs efforts were separated from 
government activities. In other words, collaboration between the Nevis government and the NGOs was 
non-existent. According to inhabitants, leadership provided by the Nevisian government was not 
effective. The omission of the national disaster coordinator was particularly noteworthy.212 The 
organization between St. Kitts and Nevis themselves was limited during disaster recovery. Most 
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programs operated independently on both islands. This was mainly due to the fact that both islands had 
their own disaster plan, which did not include plans how coordination between the islands should be 
formed during an emergency. Historically, collaborative efforts had been limited, and long before Hugo 
there existed a sense of mistrust between the people of the two islands.213 There was even an accusation 
of Nevis officials that St. Kitts kept an unfair portion of the recovery aid, this even lead to growing 
support in Nevis for secession. In short, all instances of linkage between recovery and development on 
St. Kitts and Nevis occurred on an ad hoc basis, due to the fact that in the disaster plans there was no 
mention of how these linkages, either between the governments and / or the NGOs, should be 
implemented during a disaster.214
The rebuilding of public and private structures often incorporated structural strengthening 
measures. The improved buildings included the electrical power plant on St. Kitts, schools, utility poles 
and reinforced seawalls. Replaced homes were in general structurally stronger, more aesthetically 
pleasing, cooler and more comfortable.215 However, inadequate mitigation requirements in the national 
building code, on both islands, and inadequate  workmanship by unqualified people constrained 
effective monitoring and enforcement. In fact, NGOs were generally more effective at monitoring the 
distribution of aid and in ensuring that aid recipients complied with guidelines, than any governmental 
organization. Although the demands on domestic organizations were extensive and in many instances 
exceeded their capabilities, St. Kitts and Nevis organizations were not nearly as overwhelmed in 
dealing with foreign disaster relief organizations as those on Montserrat.216
In the general, the governments on both islands had insufficient staffing in terms of number of 
positions and expertise. The staffing of local NGOs was better and plans have been made to integrate 
these NGOs into ongoing emergency preparedness and response activities. Building supplies on St. 
Kitts and Nevis met most of the needs for reconstruction. Compared to Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis 
had smaller portions of their housing stock damaged, which minimized heavy reliance on foreign aid. 
Thus unlike Montserrat’s high level of dependency on foreign aid, recovery on St. Kitts and Nevis was 
not substantially constrained by time and effort spent seeking such aid.217 
Long term recovery; hurricanes Luis, Georges and Jose 
Three significant hurricanes hit St. Kitts-Nevis after Hugo; hurricane Luis in 1995, hurricane 
Georges in 1998 and hurricane Jose in 1999. These storms were less destructive for the islands. It 
appears that the residents of these islands were much better prepared than before Hugo. Only hurricane 
Georges caused significant damage. On St. Kitts, 85 percent of the housing stock was severely 
damaged, while an estimated 35 percent of the housing stock on Nevis sustained minor damage, mainly 
roofing.218 
In general, people were better alerted to the arrival of the hurricanes, and higher levels of 
preparedness were reported by the disaster coordinator on Nevis. Two factors could have attributed to 
the increased preparedness. First, a disaster coordinator was appointed in 1993, who was responsible 
for the dissemination of hurricane warnings.219 Second, prior to hurricane Hugo in 1989, 61 years had 
passed since a hurricane had affected the islands. Thus, people were ill prepared for such an event. In 
213Ibidem, 135.
214Ibidem, 138.
215Ibidem, 141. 
216Ibidem, 145.
217Ibidem, 146.
218Alexis Hobson, 'The Responses of Residents of Nevis to Hurricane Threat', 167.
219Ibidem, 168.
39
the years that followed, people became aware of the danger and created a disaster-management culture 
on the two islands. 
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        Conclusion 
The  aim  for  this  paper  is  to  compare  small-island  entities  in  the  Lesser  Antilles,  and  to 
determine how their different constitutional constellations have affected disaster-management since the 
post-war  period.  Secondly,  the  aim  is  to  find  out  if  disasters  have  affected  the  constitutional 
constellations of these same islands. This aim asks for two questions. First, how did the constitutional 
status influence disaster-management on each entity? Second, did a disaster, or a number of disasters 
cause constitutional change between an entity and its (former) metropole? These two questions will be 
answered consecutively in this conclusion.
Constitutional status and disaster-management 
It appears that, the closer the ties are with the metropole, the better disaster-management is 
conducted.  When  hurricane  Luis  hit  the  French  part  of  Saint  Martin,  the  response  of  the  French 
authorities was comparable to if a similar disaster would have hit a French city like Marseilles. This 
makes sense, since Saint Martin was an integral part of the French state. Prior to the storm, construction 
on  the  island was  in  general  disaster-proof.  Although some buildings  sustained damage,  it  mostly 
concerned blown-off roofs and not completely destroyed buildings.  The roads were in good order, 
which was very useful  during recovery.  Debris  was cleared with relative ease and made adequate 
distribution  of  aid  possible.  A  purpose  built  response  unit,  the  Sécurité  civile,  was  sent  over 
immediately to the nearby island of Martinique, as soon as it became clear that Luis would hit St. 
Marin. This unit was deployed and active on Saint Martin as soon as the airport was reopened. The 
state of emergency was declared on the island, which prohibited excessive looting. Next, around 3000 
soldiers and supporting personnel were sent over during the medium-term recovery period. This vast 
deployment of man-power ensured safety and a fast and adequate recovery procedure. It however also 
made  a  rigid  response  with  regard  to  the  illegal  immigrants  possible.  In  response  to  the  chaotic 
situation of these immigrants on the 'Dutch' side, the French were able to act with great effectiveness. 
As soon as the French authorities were afraid of a 'Dutch' exodus of illegal immigrants, they responded 
by checking the border and thus ensuring that the illegal immigrants would stay on the Dutch side. 
Furthermore, the French were able to prohibit the illegal immigrants from rebuilding the slums and 
proved to be more efficient at housing illegal immigrants in camps and subsequent arrangements to 
provide them with air flights to their place of origin. Funding of the recovery process was for a large 
part provided by the French state. Aid from the the central government in France was not a point of 
debate, since St. Martin was regarded as an integral part of the French Republic, and could therefore 
count on adequate support. As mentioned, another part or city, like Marseilles, in France would also 
have received aid from the central government if a similar disaster had struck the French mainland. 
If we now compare the French with the 'Dutch' constellation, we can assess that the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands was entangled in a crisis of authority, with dire effects on the immediate recovery 
process. As was stated in the Charter of Kingdom, the Kingdom-partners should accord each other with 
assistance in a case of emergency. Although aid was  provided by the Netherlands, and even by 
Suriname when they were a part of the Kingdom, the immediate response was minimal, medium-term 
response was adequate, but, the long-term recovery effort was provided, with a list of demands from 
the benefactor. Before Hugo, the Dutch government relied mainly on charities in case of disasters, and 
was  reluctant  to  provide  serious  aid  or  disaster-management.  By  the  time  Hugo  hit,  due  to  the 
considerable damage, the Dutch were almost forced to lend assistance. Help was provided, but the 
funds which were made available, were in fact already destined for the Netherlands Antilles. In effect 
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the funds consisted of previously reserved development aid, made available sooner for the recovery 
process after Hugo. Hurricane Luis proved to be the most destructive nature-induced disaster that hit 
St.  Maarten  in  history.  The  excessive  damage-recovery  costs  in  addition  to  a  growing  deficit  of 
Netherlands Antilles' budget, urged the Dutch government to respond and to make additional funds 
available.  However,  getting these additional  funds where they were needed the most  proved to be 
difficult.
The autonomous state  of the Netherlands Antilles combined with its  budget  deficit  and the 
financial supervision that was in place on St. Maarten, complicated the Dutch aid effort. As stated, the 
Dutch were willing to provide aid, but wanted to provide this to St. Maarten only in parts and through 
specific projects. The Dutch government was afraid that the aid would otherwise go into the wrong 
pockets, because there was much corruption on the island. Minister Voorhoeve of Antillean affairs 
further complicated matters for the Antilleans by granting the gezaghebber,  Mr.  Richardson, of St. 
Maarten with additional authority with regard to the recovery process and the distribution of aid. The 
Netherlands Antilles and the democratic process on St. Maarten were effectively bypassed by the Dutch 
government. The additional authority Richardson received, which effectively made him the supreme 
leader of the island, led to opposition in the Netherlands Antilles. A compromise was reached, which 
granted  the  executive  council  and  the  island  council  of  St.  Maarten  some  power,  but  only  after 
decisions had been made. The matter of fact was that the Netherlands Antilles needed the Dutch aid, 
and had to accept the Dutch demands. The growing deficit of the Netherlands Antilles and some of the 
islands left them unable to provide in the voluminous sum needed to adequately aid St. Maarten and to 
make sure that the coming tourist season would not be lost. Loss of extra revenue generated by tourism 
would have added to the financial misery. 
On Montserrat, the situation was again a bit worse than on St Maarten. After hurricane Hugo 
hit, immediate help was provided by the UK. Funds were made available and UK military personnel 
aided the stuck island. They mainly restricted themselves to short term, direct recovery work. Medium- 
and  long-term recovery  came from multiple  sources,  but  not  from the  UK.  Furthermore,  a  badly 
functioning state apparatus hampered long term recovery. The small and understaffed government of 
the 'Emerald island' had difficulties controlling the aid, which was in need of centralization. Multiple 
assessments  of  the  damage  led  to  administrative  chaos  and  no,  or  inadequate  aid  for  the  needy. 
Corruption led to the loss of building materials and some aid was found to be unsatisfactory, like the 
housing which was provided by the US peace corps. The inability of the government of Montserrat to 
cope with the aftermath of hurricane Hugo can be attributed to two main causes. The first was the 
absence  of  any experience  with  hurricanes.  Hurricanes  had not  hit  Montserrat  since  decades,  and 
therefore hardly any predisaster preparations had been made. The second reason is the lack of funds. 
Montserrat was relatively poor and had a loose relationship with the UK. The UK tended to neglect its 
Caribbean dependencies. Hurricane Hugo and other disasters forced the UK, to some degree, to review 
its relationship with its dependencies. Which will be the topic of the next section of this conclusion.
Like on Montserrat, hurricane Hugo was the first significant hurricane to hit St. Kitts-Nevis in 
decades. The independent federation did receive some direct aid from its former colonizer. A British 
Royal Navy ship provided aid. Although damage was considerable, the damage to the housing stock 
was significantly less in comparison to Montserrat. Thus much less time was spent in search of foreign 
aid. Like Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis had to rely primarily on foreign aid. NGOs proved to be more able 
than government institutions on both islands, since the governments lacked staff, both in number and in 
experience. Like on Montserrat, damage assessment was done by numerous organizations which led to 
chaotic aid distribution. Nevis was more heavily damaged than St. Kitts and the Nevisian disaster plan 
proved  to  inadequate,  which  led  to  poor  coordination  of  the  relief  effort.  There  was  also  little 
cooperation between the two islands, which increased the already present mistrust between the two 
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federation members. In general, the independent status of St. Kitts-Nevis caused that the country had to 
rely on itself and on foreign aid to deal with the recovery after Hugo. Damage was not as severe as on  
Montserrat,  and the disaster  led to  an increase in  disaster-awareness on the island and subsequent 
improvements  in  overall  disaster-management  on the islands,  although federal  cooperation did not 
increase. 
Thus, in short, it becomes clear that the relationship with the former colonizer had great impact 
on the size and effectiveness of disaster-management. While French St Martin could count on a sizable 
and  specialized  disaster  relief  team  as  well  as  funds  for  recovery,  the  other  islands  faced  more 
difficulties. Dutch St Maarten did receive aid, but more limited than than the French and with more  
heavy consequences (control of government). Montserrat could in fact only count on direct relief aid 
while St Kitts and Nevis were even more left on their own.
The influence of disasters on the constitutional relationship
Let us now ask if disasters have influenced the constitutional status of these islands. A single 
nature-induced disaster may not cause  constitutional change  on its own. However, it can work as a 
catalyst with regard to constitutional change. The aftermath of nature-induced disasters can initiate or 
intensify already present discussions about the constitutional relationship between an island and its 
metropole.  Where the constitutional constellation is clear and tends to be accepted, like incorporated 
Saint Martin or the independent St. Kitts-Nevis, nature-induced disasters do not seem to initiate 
discussions about constitutional change. However, where the situation is unclear, nature-induced 
disasters can lead to change. 
On 'Dutch' St. Maarten, discussions about the constitutional relationship where already 
underway by the time hurricane Luis hit the island in 1995. During the 1990s, subsequent Dutch 
governments changed the course of their stance towards the Kingdom. Prior to the 1990s, the aim was 
to turn the Netherlands Antilles into a completely sovereign state. Thereafter, the focus shifted to good 
governance. The Netherlands Antilles turned out to be a money pit and, next to structural budget 
deficits, consecutive hurricanes from 1989 through the 1990s, with Luis as the most destructive, 
increased the demand for funds by the Netherlands Antilles. Because of this, the Netherlands wanted 
increasing control over their funds, which led to increasing demands from the Dutch toward the 
Antilleans. The manner in which aid was provided during the aftermath of Luis is an excellent example 
of this. In this case, the Netherlands Antilles and the democratic process on St. Maarten were 
effectively bypassed by the Netherlands. Power was granted by the Dutch to the gezaghebber and 
supervision was granted to the governor of the Antilles, whom were both non-elected officials, but 
appointed by the Crown. 
I do not want to state here that hurricanes led to the dismantlement of the Netherlands Antilles 
and the strict financial supervision which is now in place on St. Maarten. However, hurricanes do act as 
catalysts on already existing tendencies. The discussions on the status  of the Dutch Antilles  arose 
because these small-island entities became  the victim of a whole range of weaknesses. The 
dismantlement of the Netherlands Antilles in 2010 did lead to a status aparte of St. Maarten and to a 
more independent position de jure, but effectively the Netherlands had the better position during 
negotiations. When it came to the dismantlement, the Netherlands agreed to  pay a voluminous and 
significant part of the Netherlands Antilles' debt. but in doing so, they could make demands. One of the 
demands was control over the financial affairs of St. Maarten. In fact, St. Maarten was presented with a 
fait accompli. The ever present weaknesses of a small-island entity proved to be unbearable for the 
Netherlands Antilles as a whole, and St. Maarten in particular, especially since nature-induced disasters 
have increased since 1989, both in severity and frequency. If St. Maarten wanted to keep receiving aid, 
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they had to adhere to the Dutch demands. Indeed, other hurricanes have hit St. Maarten since Luis. It is 
imaginable that several, severe hurricanes will hit the island consecutively in a short period of time. In 
such circumstances it is very useful to have a rich and benevolent benefactor nearby. Maybe the time 
has come to start the discussion about a Delta-plan for St. Maarten. This should of course be done with 
the approval of, or even in collaboration with, the French. 
The case of St. Maarten is comparable to that of Montserrat. By the 1990s, the period of 'benign 
neglect' with regard to their West-Indian dependencies and the aim of the UK to rid themselves of their 
former 'darlings of empire', seems to have passed. Hurricane Hugo and the subsequent destructive 
eruptions of Mount Soufriere in 1995 on Montserrat, which rendered 75 percent of the island 
uninhabitable and which destroyed most towns on the island, also seem to have worked as a catalyst, or 
even an initiator with regard to the discussion about the constitutional relationship. The consecutive 
nature-induced disasters which hit Montserrat asked for voluminous funds from the UK. The UK did 
not want to walk away from its responsibilities during the aftermath of the eruption of the volcano. 
Rather the UK wanted to be seen as a responsible state, which took care of its dependencies. Although 
the ties between the UK and its dependencies were unclear with regard to disaster-relief, and the ties in 
general  tended to be loose and distant, by the end of 1990s this had changed. The constitutional status 
between the UK and Montserrat was  formalized. Montserratians were allowed to move to the UK, a 
right which they lacked before. No more attempts were made to create new federations with the 
different British entities in the Caribbean. In addition, no more attempts were made to force 
independence upon the islands. In return for Britain's willingness to respect the wish of the islands to 
continue under British sovereignty, the newly formed Overseas Territories did have to adhere to certain 
obligations, which included the observance of human rights, law and order and good governance. 
St. Kitts-Nevis did not engage in any attempt to change their constitutional status after hurricane 
Hugo. In general, St. Kitts-Nevis proved that they could take care of themselves. Maybe disasters in the 
future will change this stance/situation. In the end, the four major hurricanes which struck St. Kitts-
Nevis during the period 1989-1999, did cause damage with a total worth of US$ 684 million. For such 
a small entity that is a large sum to collect in foreign aid. It is however noteworthy that here too, 
disasters caused discussions on the constitutional status: in this case the unclear relationship 
between the two islands Kitts and Nevis. The aftermath of hurricane Hugo intensified tensions 
between the two islands. Accusations about unfair aid-distribution and a mutual unwillingness to 
cooperate with regard to disaster-management, show that this remnant of the British federal 
experiment in the Caribbean may need constitutional revision amongst itself. Thus, hurricanes may 
also initiate or act as a catalyst between St. Kitts and Nevis too. 
 The annual hurricane seasons in the Caribbean have been increasing in severity during the past 
two decades. Whether this increase is attributed to global warming or not, the fact is that adequate 
disaster-management is needed throughout the region. All construction should be hurricane-proof. The 
almost insurmountable costs can only be provided if cooperation among the Caribbean islands is 
increased. The exchange of knowledge and even funds is needed to create a more safe and sustainable 
Caribbean. 
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